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MY BRETHREN’S (GATE) KEEPER? 
TESTIMONY BY U.S. JUDGES AT OTHERS’ 
SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION HEARINGS: 
Its Implications for Judicial Independence 
and Judicial Ethics 
Mary L. Clark† 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines the merits of federal judges testifying at others’ 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings. Interest in this project was prompted 
by the testimony of seven of Samuel Alito’s then-current and former Third 
Circuit colleagues at his hearing to be Associate Justice.  
The judges’ testimony at Justice Alito’s hearing was unprecedented in 
degree and kind. Because the Alito hearing testimony involved a significant 
expansion in number and status of judges testifying at another’s judicial 
confirmation hearing, this practice should be examined now before it can 
be repeated. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Should federal judges testify at others’ Article III confirmation hearings,1 
or does such testimony (whether supporting or opposing the nominee) raise 
concern for the appropriate role or function for judges? More specifically, 
does such testimony risk undermining the independence of the judiciary by 
injecting judges into an executive and legislative branch function and by 
potentially exposing individual judges and the judiciary to undue legislative 
and public scrutiny? Does such testimony suggest, or actually reflect, 
partiality and political activity in violation of the judges’ ethical 
obligations? 
Or are we (the public, interested court observers, those involved in the 
three-branch system) not concerned about judges testifying at other judges’ 
confirmation hearings because federal judges already provide evaluations, 
even recommendations, of Article III candidates behind-the-scenes (through 
informal consultations with executive and legislative branch appointment 
officials and confidential interviews with members of the American Bar 
Association’s Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary)? Is there a 
meaningful distinction between public testimony and private contact? If so, 
what is it? 
Is it preferable that judicial colleagues’ opinions of Article III candidates 
be offered publicly at Senate confirmation hearings because of the greater 
transparency of process that this forum appears to provide? Or is that 
venue’s apparent transparency just that, more apparent than real? In light of 
                                                                                                                            
1. This article focuses on testimony by sitting federal judges at others’ Supreme Court 
confirmation hearings. First, it focuses on testimony by sitting judges, i.e., active judges or 
those on senior status who continue to hear cases. 
Second, this article does not address the phenomenon of judicial nominees testifying at their 
own Supreme Court confirmation hearings, where federal judges nominated for elevation to the 
Supreme Court, or from Associate Justice to Chief Justice, have testified on their own behalf for 
decades. For a recent argument that judicial nominees should not testify at their own Senate 
confirmation hearing, see generally BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING 
INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES 1 (2006). Some of the arguments made by Wittes 
against nominee testimony could easily be applied to nominees’ colleagues’ testimony, 
including the lack of particularities that are and can be testified to with regard to actual cases 
and issues likely to come before the Court for decision. 
Third, the article focuses on testimony at others’ Supreme Court confirmation hearings, 
where different processes are used for appointing non-Article III magistrate and bankruptcy 
judges, including primary reliance on sitting district and circuit court judges as judicial 
selectors. These non-Article III appointments practices have been studied at length by Judith 
Resnik, see, e.g., Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, 
and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 605–07 (2005), and I address them separately in an 
article on judges as judicial selectors. See Mary L. Clark, Judges as Judicial Selectors: Should 
Currently Serving Judges Sit on Commissions to Screen and Recommend Article III Candidates 
Below the Supreme Court Level? (forthcoming). 
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what many have termed the “theatrical” nature of judicial confirmation 
hearings, especially at the Supreme Court level, does judges’ participation 
in them risk negative effects on the public’s trust and confidence in the 
judiciary? Is private contact with appointments officials and ABA 
representatives preferable to public hearing testimony because the private 
contact is likely more candid because it is less staged? 
Should consideration of the desirability of judges testifying turn on 
whether they are providing positive, negative, or neutral assessments of a 
judicial nominee? Do judges lend their credibility and prestige of office to 
judicial candidates by testifying at their hearings? How do judges testifying 
at others’ Article III confirmation hearings compare with judges’ roles in 
other judicial appointments systems, at the state, federal, national, and 
international levels? Ultimately, what is the optimal role, if any, for judges 
in the judicial appointments process? 
It is with these questions in mind that I turn to the testimony by seven 
current and former judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
at Samuel Alito’s confirmation hearing as Associate Justice in January 
2006. The Third Circuit judges’ testimony was unprecedented in both 
degree and kind. Though current and former federal judges have testified at 
others’ Supreme Court confirmation hearings off and on since 1969, only 
once before Justice Alito’s hearing did a judge who was then currently 
serving on the same court as the nominee testify (as in the Alito hearing), 
but that involved a single judge, who did not call for his colleague’s 
confirmation (as at the Alito hearing). Rather, this judge-witness explained 
why the nominee’s actions in a specific case did not merit the ethics charges 
lodged against him.2 Because judges’ testimony at others’ confirmation 
hearings took a new turn with the Alito hearing in terms of number and 
status of judges and nature of testimony, the practice should be examined 
now before it can be repeated.3 
                                                                                                                            
2. See infra Part II.A for a discussion of Judge Harrison Winter’s testimony at Judge 
Clement Haynsworth’s confirmation hearing to be Associate Justice. 
3. Careful consideration of the desirability of judges testifying at others’ confirmation 
hearings is especially important in the context of today’s Supreme Court appointments, where 
ten of the last eleven Supreme Court candidates served on the court of appeals at the time of 
nomination. See Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and 
Tenure of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 974, 983–85 (2007) (citing Lee Epstein et al., 
The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903, 908–17 (2003)) (highlighting the new norm and the 
resulting potential for creating “undesirable incentives for decisions made with an eye to 
advancement”); Terri L. Peretti, Where Have All the Politicians Gone? Recruiting for the 
Modern Supreme Court, 91 JUDICATURE 112, 113–20 (2007) (discussing the findings of Epstein 
et al., supra). 
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Despite active debate on the merits of the Third Circuit judges’ 
appearance at the time of Justice Alito’s confirmation hearing,4 surprisingly 
little has been written about it since then.5 This article seeks to fill that gap. 
Part II begins by charting the history of judicial testimony at others’ 
                                                                                                                            
This “new” norm of Supreme Court appointments underscores the real potential for sitting 
judges to continue to act as witnesses at one another’s Supreme Court confirmation hearings. 
The nearly exclusive reliance on the federal courts of appeal as the source of Supreme Court 
nominees is a departure from historic practice, where nominees had been drawn in relatively 
equal number from private practice, the executive branch, state courts, and the federal bench 
until twenty years ago. See DAVID M. O’BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 39 (1988); see also LEE 
EPSTEIN ET AL., Table 4-9: Prior Judicial Experience of the Justices, in THE SUPREME COURT 
COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 324–32 (3d ed., CQ Press 2003); Table 
4-10: Summary of Background Characteristics of the Justices of the United States, in THE 
SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS, supra. 
4. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Should Judges Testify at a Colleague’s Senate 
Confirmation Hearing? The Separation-of-Powers Concern Raised by the Alito Hearings, 
FINDLAW, Jan. 16, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20060116.html (addressing the 
testimony’s separation of powers implications and compliance with governing judicial conduct 
code). 
Several news outlets commented at the time of the Alito hearing on the unusual nature of the 
Third Circuit judges’ participation. The New York Times ran an editorial the day before the 
judges’ testimony, flagging concern for the judges’ injecting themselves into Supreme Court 
appointments politics and for the use of the prestige of judicial office to further partisan 
interests: 
It is extraordinary for judges to thrust themselves into a controversial 
Supreme Court nomination in this way, a move that could reasonably be 
construed as a partisan gesture. The judges will be doing harm to the federal 
bench . . . . Their testimony’s greatest value will almost certainly not stem 
from the facts the judges provide, but from the prestige they hold as members 
of the federal judiciary. 
Editorial, Fairness in the Alito Hearings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2006, at A28. Noting that the 
judges’ “planned testimony does not appear to violate judicial canons,” the Times observed that 
it nonetheless “brushes up against them.” Id. The editorial concluded, “Judge Becker and his 
colleagues are beginning a process of politicizing the federal judiciary that all of us will most 
likely come to regret.” Id.; see also Bob Egelko, Questions Raised About Having Judges Testify, 
S.F. CHRON., Jan. 13, 2006, at A7; Richard Simon, 3rd Circuit Colleagues Trumpet Alito, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2006, at A-23. 
5. Two pieces published post-hearing have addressed the testimony. See Alan B. 
Morrison, Judges and Politics: What to Do and Not to Do About Some Inevitable Problems, 28 
JUST. SYS. J. 283, 297–99 (2007); Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of 
Impropriety and the Proposed New ABA Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1369–72 & 
nn.146–55 (2006). 
Rotunda addressed the judges’ testimony briefly, noting that the testimony had been 
presented and asserting that the governing conduct code “does not prohibit this testimony by 
fellow judges.” Id. at 1370. I question Rotunda’s conclusion in Part V of this article. 
Morrison’s essay addressed the judges’ Alito hearing testimony at greater length than 
Rotunda, though it was not principally focused on this issue. See Morrison, supra; infra Parts 
IV–V for a discussion of Morrison’s essay. 
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Supreme Court confirmation hearings. Part III introduces findings of 
interviews with current and former Third Circuit judges on the desirability 
of judges testifying at others’ Supreme Court confirmation hearings. Part IV 
explores the judicial independence implications of this testimony, noting 
potential impacts on institutional comity and individual judges’ behavior. 
Thereafter, Part V considers the testimony’s permissibility under the 
governing judicial conduct code, noting that while some code provisions 
appear to authorize or even encourage it, others arguably counsel against it. 
Mindful of the views articulated by many of the judges with whom I 
spoke that an appellate judge’s immediate colleagues have something 
uniquely valuable to contribute to the judicial elevation process given their 
close work in collaborative decision making, the article considers whether 
there are other ways in the Supreme Court appointments process through 
which judges could share their knowledge of and experiences with actual or 
prospective candidates. Part VI explores alternative approaches to judicial 
participation in the judicial appointments process, drawing on comparisons 
with judicial roles in judicial selection systems at the state, federal, national, 
and international levels. The article concludes by calling for an end to 
public testimony by judges at others’ Article III confirmation hearings 
because, on balance, the testimony’s costs outweigh its potential benefits. 
II. HISTORY OF TESTIMONY BY U.S. JUDGES AT OTHERS’ SUPREME COURT 
CONFIRMATION HEARINGS 
A. Overview of History of Judges’ Testimony at Others’ Supreme Court 
Confirmation Hearings 
Current and former federal judges have testified at ten of the last 
seventeen Supreme Court confirmation hearings,6 though only two involved 
testimony by then-current colleagues, most recently, at Justice Alito’s 
hearing and before that, at Judge Clement Haynsworth’s hearing to be 
Associate Justice.7 Haynsworth’s 1969 hearing marked the first time that an 
Article III judge testified at another’s Supreme Court confirmation hearing. 
There, Judge Harrison Winter of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit testified about a case in which he and Chief Fourth Circuit Judge 
Haynsworth had participated, for which concerns had been raised regarding 
                                                                                                                            
6. Indeed, current and former judges have testified at nine of the last fourteen hearings. 
7. See infra app. A for a complete listing of testimony by current and former federal 
judges at others’ Supreme Court confirmation hearings. 
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Haynsworth’s purchase of a stock interest in one of the parties during the 
pendency of the appeal. Judge Winter’s testimony addressed the appellate 
history of the case and spoke to whether Judge Haynsworth had complied 
with the governing judicial conduct code.8 
Since that time, current and/or former federal judges have testified at the 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings of William Rehnquist to be Associate 
Justice (1971) and Chief Justice (1986), Robert Bork to be Associate Justice 
(1987), Anthony Kennedy to be Associate Justice (1987), David Souter to 
be Associate Justice (1990), Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice 
(1991), Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be Associate Justice (1993), John Roberts 
to be Chief Justice (2005), and Samuel Alito to be Associate Justice 
(2006).9 
Focusing more narrowly on testimony by sitting (and not retired or 
former) federal judges at others’ Supreme Court confirmation hearings 
(with which this article is specifically concerned), a complete listing of that 
testimony is as follows: 
• Clement Haynsworth to be Associate Justice (1969) (Haynsworth 
was Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit at that time): 
Testimony by Judge Harrison Winter of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 
• William Rehnquist to be Associate Justice (1971) (Rehnquist was 
not a judge at that time):  
Testimony by Judge Walter Craig of the U.S. District Court for 
Arizona in support. 
• Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice (1991) (Thomas was 
then a D.C. Circuit judge):  
Testimony by Judge Jack Tanner of the U.S. District Court for 
Washington in support. 
• Samuel Alito to be Associate Justice (2006) (Alito was then a 
Third Circuit judge):  
                                                                                                                            
8. Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., of S.C., to Be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the  Comm. on the Judiciary U.S. Senate, 
91st Cong. 236–62 (1969) (statement of Hon. Harrison L. Winter, 4th Cir.). 
9. See infra app. A for details of this testimony. 
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Testimony by five sitting (and two former) judges of the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in support. 
As this list reveals, two of the three pre-Alito instances of sitting judges 
testifying at another’s Supreme Court confirmation hearing did not involve 
judges from the nominee’s own court (Rehnquist in 1971; Thomas in 1991). 
As such, these judge-witnesses did not confront the prospect of continuing 
to serve with the nominee if the Senate rejected the nomination. Also of 
significance, because they did not serve on the same court as the nominee, 
these earlier judge-witnesses could not, and did not, testify to confidential 
judicial deliberations or decision making processes. 
Placing judicial testimony at Supreme Court confirmation hearings in 
brief historic context, it was not until 1916 that the Senate hosted its first 
public Supreme Court confirmation hearing, for Justice Louis Brandeis. 
This was shortly after passage of the constitutional amendment providing 
for direct election of Senators, in 1913. As John Maltese notes, “Twentieth-
century changes in the Senate made that body more accountable to the 
people and led to a more visible Supreme Court confirmation process.”10 
According to Maltese, “[t]hose changes made participants in the 
confirmation process more responsive to public opinion, but they also 
prompted participants to wage their own campaigns to mobilize public 
opinion. Aware that mass sentiment could influence the Senate vote on a 
Supreme Court nomination, they attempted to direct public opinion.”11 
Supreme Court nominees did not testify at their own confirmation hearings 
until Harlan Fiske Stone did so in 1925,12 and such testimony did not 
become a regular practice until John Marshall Harlan’s hearing in 1955.13 
Sandra Day O’Connor’s hearing to be Associate Justice marked the first 
time a Supreme Court confirmation hearing was broadcast live, in 1981.14 
Live media coverage and lengthy candidate testimony are now part of the 
regular fabric of Supreme Court confirmation hearings.15 The question for 
this article is whether testimony by the nominee’s judicial colleagues should 
likewise become standard practice. 
                                                                                                                            
10. JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 116 (1995). 
11. Id.; see also MICHAEL COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THE JUDGING OF SUPREME 
COURT NOMINEES 13–14 (2004). 
12. ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 19 (1997). 
13. Id. at 18. 
14. Id. at 9. 
15. Id. 
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B. Third Circuit Judges’ Testimony at Justice Alito’s Hearing 
Judge Edward Becker16 introduced the Third Circuit judges’ testimony at 
Justice Alito’s hearing by underscoring the relevance and importance of 
judicial colleagues’ testimony:  
“Sam Alito became my colleague when he joined our court in 
1990. Since that time, we have sat on over a thousand cases 
together, and I have therefore come to know him well as a judge 
and as a human being. Many do not fully understand the intensity 
of the intellectual and personal relationship among appellate 
judges. We always sit together in panels of three and, in the course 
of deciding and writing up cases, engage in the most rigorous 
dialog with each other.” 17 
Emphasizing the intensity of the judicial colleague relationship, Judge 
Becker stated that he was “a good judge of the four matters that I think are 
the central focus of this Committee as it decides whether to consent to this 
nomination—Sam Alito’s temperament, his integrity, his intellect and his 
approach to the law.”18 Judge Becker drew attention to the uniqueness of 
judicial colleagues’ insights into one another’s character gained from their 
participation in confidential post-argument conferences: “[T]here is an 
aspect of appellate judging that no one gets to see, no one but the judges 
themselves—how they behave in conference after oral argument, at which 
point the case is decided, and which I submit is the most critically important 
phase of the appellate judicial process.”19 Explicitly drawing on his 
observations of then-Judge Alito in these confidential proceedings, Judge 
Becker asserted, “In hundreds of conferences, I have never once heard Sam 
raise his voice, express anger or sarcasm, or even try to proselytize. Rather, 
he expresses his views in measured and tempered tones.”20 
                                                                                                                            
16. Judge Becker was a former chief judge and then-current senior judge of the Third 
Circuit. See Tim Weiner, Edward R. Becker, 73, Judge on Federal Court of Appeals, Dies, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 20, 2006, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/20/us/20becker.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&oref=slogin. He 
died in May 2006. Id. 
17. Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. 654 (2006) [hereinafter 
Alito Hearing] (statement of Judge Edward Becker). 
18. Id. In articulating what he thought was the Committee’s central focus in confirmation, 
Judge Becker might be understood as suggesting what he thought should be the Committee’s 
central concern. Whether Becker’s weighing in on the question of what evaluation criteria 
should be used presents separation of powers concerns is a question addressed in Part IV, 
below. 
19. Id.  
20. Id. at 655. 
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Judge Becker’s testimony was followed by that of four current and two 
former colleagues. The four sitting judges who testified after Judge Becker 
included two active judges, Anthony Scirica (Chief Judge of the Third 
Circuit) and Maryanne Trump Barry (Third Circuit judge with whom Alito 
had also worked at the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New 
Jersey), and two senior judges, Ruggero Aldisert (former chief judge of the 
Third Circuit) and Leonard I. Garth (Third Circuit judge for whom Alito 
had also served as a law clerk).21 The two former judges who testified were 
Timothy K. Lewis (currently serving as a partner at Schnader Harrison 
Segal and Lewis in Washington, D.C.), who had served with then-Judge 
Alito before resigning from the Third Circuit bench, and John Gibbons 
(former chief judge of the Third Circuit, currently serving as a partner in the 
Newark, New Jersey law firm of Gibbons, Del Deo et al.), whose 1990 
resignation from the bench created the vacancy occupied by then-Judge 
Alito at the time of his Supreme Court nomination. 22 
The five active and senior judges who testified constituted one-quarter of 
Alito’s then-current Third Circuit colleagues (comprising twenty active and 
senior judges in all). Fifteen others did not participate, raising questions as 
to why some judges, and not others, testified. It was with this and other 
questions—for the merits of this type of testimony and its potential 
implications for judicial independence and judicial ethics—that I sought to 
interview the Third Circuit judges who had testified as well as those who 
had not.  
Themes addressed in the judges’ testimony included their unique insights 
as judges into Alito’s judicial temperament and character through years of 
shared work in confidential deliberations,23 whether Alito was a “movement 
person” or “ideologue,”24 whether he approached judicial decision making 
with an open mind,25 whether he was respectful of his colleagues’ differing 
views,26 and whether Alito had the impartiality and integrity necessary to be 
a Supreme Court justice.27 
Following the panelists’ prepared statements, Senator Specter introduced 
the Senate Judiciary Committee questioning of the judge-witnesses by, inter 
alia, soliciting impressions of Alito formed during the judges’ confidential 
                                                                                                                            
21. Id. at 656–57, 659, 661. 
22.  Id. at 664, 667. 
23. Id. at 657. 
24. Id. at 655, 682. 
25. See generally id. at 665–67. 
26. Id. at 655. 
27. See generally id. at 663, 668, 682. 
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post-argument conferences.28 Then-ranking minority Committee member 
Senator Patrick Leahy refused to question the judge-witnesses on the 
ground that, if confirmed, Alito might need to recuse himself from 
considering decisions participated in by his testifying colleagues.29 
Democratic Committee members Senators Richard Durbin and Russell 
Feingold likewise declined to question the judge-witnesses, aligning 
themselves with Leahy’s concerns.30 Prior to the judges’ testimony, Senator 
Durbin had asked then-Judge Alito whether the judges’ testimony had been 
his idea, or whether he had been consulted as to its merits, and Alito had 
responded “no” to both inquiries. 
Senator Dianne Feinstein was the only Democratic Senator to participate 
in the Committee questioning. Among other issues, Feinstein inquired about 
the judges’ understandings of Alito’s views of the Supreme Court’s 
abortion jurisprudence, specifically whether Alito understood Roe and 
Casey to be settled law or not.31 The panelists declined to respond to 
Senator Feinstein’s questioning on this matter,32 with Judge Becker 
                                                                                                                            
28. Id. at 669. For example, Specter asked, “Judge Becker, the conference is a unique 
opportunity, as has been explained, to really find out about what your colleagues think. [I]s it 
your judgment that Judge Alito would allow his personal views on a matter to influence his 
decisions as a Justice?” Id. Judge Becker responded, “I do not think—I am confident that he 
would not.” Id. 
Continuing to solicit impressions of Alito made in conference, Senator Specter asked Judge 
Barry about Alito’s treatment of women’s issues: “Judge Barry, you have sat with him in these 
private conferences, known him for a long time, back to the days when you were in . . . the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office when he was an assistant. How would you evaluate Judge Alito on his 
consideration of women’s issues?” Id. at 670. Judge Barry responded, “If I had to add anything 
to my initial testimony, I would have stated more about what Sam and I did together on this 
wonderful court and how reasonable he was and how he never indicated bias of any kind.” Id. 
29. Id. at 675. 
30. Id. at 676. One day earlier, when Alito was still a witness before the Committee, 
Feingold had asked Alito whether he thought he might need to recuse himself, once on the 
Supreme Court, from reviewing cases that had been decided by his soon-to-be testifying 
colleagues. Id. at 773, 791. Alito stated that he could not respond at that time because he had not 
previously considered the question, but would be happy to file a response with the Committee at 
the hearing’s conclusion, which he did. Id. 
Alito’s written response expressed concern that recusal would produce an eight-person 
Court, leading to the possibility of an evenly divided vote in a case. Id. at 791. Alito then 
observed: “Lack of a definitive resolution to a case when the litigants have no higher court that 
could resolve their cases undermines the judicial process.” Id.; see infra notes 136–55 and 
accompanying text on the recusal question. 
31. Alito Hearing, supra note 17, at 672–73. 
32. Id. at 673. Senator Feinstein noted, “I asked Judge Alito, and I thought at the very least 
he was going to agree with Justice Roberts, and he said, well, it all depends upon what settled 
means. What do you make of that?” Id. Judge Barry stated, “I respectfully cannot characterize 
what Judge Alito meant by that and I would much prefer not to have to try,” and Feinstein 
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intervening: “I think we are here as fact witnesses more than opinion 
witnesses, Senator Feinstein. I really would not answer that question.”33 
Senator Specter concluded the Committee questioning by underscoring 
the special perspective the judges brought to the confirmation hearing, again 
referencing their participation in confidential post-argument conferences 
with the nominee:  
[I]t is certainly obvious that the insights which you judges have to 
Judge Alito’s background are unique. When you talk about what 
goes on in those conferences, you are the only ones who are there 
and you have much more insight as to the opinions he has written 
that you have worked with him on.34  
Observing that the Committee had “30 witnesses who are coming in and 
that has been a traditional part of the process,” Specter asserted that he 
knew “of no situation where witnesses have more to say which is relevant 
and weighty.”35 Noting, “[p]erhaps weight is the best evidentiary 
characterization of what you have had to say,” Senator Specter asserted, 
“[a] lot of things can be relevant, but especially where you have the issue 
which has been before this Committee as to Judge Alito’s agenda or Judge 
Alito’s approach or Judge Alito’s personal views dominating his judicial 
determinations, this panel is right on the head.”36 
In closing the session, Senator Specter addressed the precedential value 
of the Third Circuit judges’ testimony: “It has been an unusual panel, but 
that is really not a strike against the practice. It may be a precedent for the 
future and it, I think, will be a good precedent.”37 “[W]henever you try 
something new, there are differing voices,” noted Specter, “but I think it is 
an extraordinary contribution which this panel has made to this process.”38 
Ten senators who voted to confirm Justice Alito cited the Third Circuit 
judges’ testimony as influencing their vote.39 Two senators who voted 
                                                                                                                            
responded, “That is fine. Anybody?” Id. Judge Becker intervened at this point, as quoted in the 
text. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 680. 
35. Id.  
36. Id.  
37.  Id. 
38. Id.  
39. These ten senators were Senators Susan Collins, Mike DeWine, Chuck Hagel, Orrin 
Hatch, Trent Lott, Lisa Murkowski, Jeff Sessions, Richard Shelby, Olympia Snowe, and John 
Warner. See, e.g., Sen. Collins Announces Intent to Vote in Favor of Judge Alito, U.S. FED. 
NEWS, Jan. 27, 2006, available at http://collins.senate.gov (search “intent to vote for judge 
Alito”) (reporting Senator Collins observing in announcing her vote to confirm Alito, “[p]erhaps 
the most compelling testimony during his confirmation hearing came from seven of Judge 
Alito’s colleagues on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. These judges, holding views ranging 
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against Alito’s confirmation cited the judges’ testimony as a concerning 
phenomenon.40 Whether the judges’ testimony was decisive of any 
Senator’s vote is unknown, though unlikely, given the amount of 
information available about Judge Alito at the time of his hearing. 
III. INTERVIEW COMMENTS BY TESTIFYING AND NON-TESTIFYING CURRENT 
AND FORMER THIRD CIRCUIT JUDGES ON THE DESIRABILITY OF JUDICIAL 
TESTIMONY AT OTHERS’ SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION HEARINGS 
To learn more about what judges themselves thought of the practice of 
judges testifying at others’ judicial confirmation hearings and why some 
judges might testify and others not—specifically why some current and 
former Third Circuit judges testified at Justice Alito’s hearing, while others 
did not—I sought to interview Justice Alito’s then-current Third Circuit 
colleagues (those who had testified as well as those who had not), along 
with the two former judges who had testified.41 What follows are highlights 
of the judges’ interview comments on how the testimony arose, the value of 
the testimony, the likelihood of negative testimony, and the testimony’s 
impact, if any, on the ABA’s role in evaluating judicial candidates. Their 
comments on the testimony’s potential impacts on judicial independence 
and judicial ethics are set forth in Parts IV and V below, and their 
suggestions of alternative mechanisms for judicial involvement in the 
judicial appointments process are included in Part VI. 
                                                                                                                            
across the political spectrum, have worked closely with Judge Alito during his 15 years on the 
bench, and they are uniquely qualified to know how he thinks, reasons, and approaches the law. 
It is significant that they were unanimous in their praise of his legal skills, his integrity, his 
evenhandedness, and his dedication to precedent and the rule of law.”); see also Sen. Murkowski 
Speaks in Support of Judge Alito High Court Nomination, U.S. FED. NEWS, Jan. 26, 2006. 
40. These were Senate Judiciary Committee member Russell Feingold and then-Senate 
Minority Leader Harry Reid. In explaining his vote, Reid noted that Alito was admired by his 
colleagues (implicitly referencing the Third Circuit judges’ testimony), but that confirmation 
was not a “popularity contest.” Harry Reid, U.S. Senator, U.S. Senator Harry Reid’s Remarks as 
Prepared for Delivery on the Senate Floor Before the Vote on the Nomination of Judge Samuel 
Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 31, 2006), available at 
http://www.kuwaitifreedom.org/media/pdf/CQ%20Transcriptions%20January,%2031%202006.
pdf (Senator Reid’s statement announcing Alito confirmation vote).  
41. See infra app. B for details of interview methodology. Where most, but not all, of the 
judges with whom I spoke made their comments for attribution, I do not identify any of them by 
name so as not to reveal the identities of those who did not speak for attribution. Moreover, I 
refer to all of my interview subjects as “judge” so as not to identify whether a current or former 
judge made the particular comment and as “he” so as not to identify the judge’s sex. I do note 
whether the judges whose comments I highlight had testified or not, where that factor may well 
be important in evaluating their comments. 
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 A. How the Alito Hearing Testimony Arose 
I began by asking how the panel testimony arose. What I learned was 
consistent with then-Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Arlen Specter’s 
press and hearing statements concerning the testimony’s origins,42 albeit in 
greater detail. My interviews revealed that Judge Becker contacted a 
number of current and former Third Circuit colleagues, by telephone in 
most instances, to ask whether they would consider testifying on then-Judge 
Alito’s behalf. Those who agreed to testify received a formal letter of 
invitation from Senator Specter as Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
One judge’s letter read:  
Judge Becker has advised me of his discussions with you 
concerning your testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee 
on the nomination of Judge Samuel Alito for the Supreme Court of 
the United States. The Committee and I would very much 
appreciate your providing that testimony because of your unique 
knowledge of Judge Alito’s work on the Third Circuit . . . .43 
 Not everyone who received a formal invitation to testify had spoken 
with Judge Becker first. Some who were not asked to testify understood that 
it was because they had had less experience working with then-Judge Alito 
than had other of their colleagues who had already agreed to testify. Others 
understood that they had not been asked to testify because their particular 
viewpoint and/or demographic status did not need further representation on 
the panel. 
                                                                                                                            
42. See, e.g., Media Stakeout with Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), Chairman, Senate 
Judiciary Committee, After the Conclusion of the Committee’s Hearing for the Day on the 
Nomination of Judge Samuel Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 11, 
2006 [hereinafter Media Stakeout]; see also Charles Babington, Sitting Judges to Speak on 
Alito's Behalf: No Conflict of Interest in Role, Specter Asserts, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2006, at 
A05, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/01/06/AR2006010601727.html; Kathy Kiely, For Specter, Alito 
Hearings Pose Internal Struggle, USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 2005, available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-12-13-specter_x.htm?csp=N009. 
According to Senator Specter’s press interview given on the eve of the judges’ testimony, 
Judge Becker had been working in Senator Specter’s office on proposed asbestos legislation 
when Kathy Kiely of USA Today interviewed Specter about the upcoming Alito confirmation 
hearing.  See Kiely, supra.  While Kiely was present, Specter and Becker discussed whether 
having testimony by some of Alito’s Third Circuit colleagues might be a useful addition to the 
hearing.  Id.  It bears mention here, as it is referenced in the press coverage, that Specter and 
Becker had been good friends for approximately fifty years by that time, having met as 
undergraduates at the University of Pennsylvania.  Id. 
43. Letter from Arlen Specter, U.S. Senator, to a judge agreeing to testify before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee on the nomination of Judge Samuel Alito for the U.S. Supreme 
Court (Dec. 20, 2005). I do not know whether other letters differ in any meaningful way from 
this judge’s letter. 
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Those judges who testified said they had not coordinated their testimony 
in advance, i.e., that the substance of the testimony was determined by each 
judge individually. Several noted, however, that Judge Becker had sought to 
compose a panel that was diverse by political party of appointing president 
and by ideology. 
B. Value of Testimony by Judicial Colleagues at Others’ Judicial Elevation 
Hearings 
Many of the judges with whom I spoke (including those who testified 
and a number of those who had not) stated a strong belief that testimony by 
a nominee’s immediate judicial colleagues was, or was among, the most 
valuable testimony that the Senate Judiciary Committee could hear, whether 
in support of or opposition to a candidate. More specifically, these judges 
emphasized that a nominee’s colleagues were among the best, if not the 
best, witnesses on questions of the nominee’s judicial demeanor, fairness, 
open-mindedness, collegiality, and approach to deciding cases (including 
whether case decisions were ideologically driven or not). Underscoring the 
uniqueness of appellate colleagues’ insights into a nominee, resulting from 
years of working together in hearing cases, discussing cases at post-
argument conferences, circulating draft opinions, and interacting in other 
court operations, many of the judges asserted that an inquisitorial body, 
such as the Senate Judiciary Committee, should want to hear from 
individuals who knew Alito as long and as well as his colleagues had, rather 
than from strangers who had never met him and who had reviewed a 
relatively small number of his opinions. As one testifying judge put it, 
“Why would an inquisitorial body not want this data? Why ask a stranger 
when you could ask those who knew him intimately? Why not go to the 
best source of this information? Why have only a stranger who has read six 
to eight opinions testify?” Another testifying judge applauded the judges’ 
testimony as a good and healthy thing, underscoring the testimony’s value 
and influence by noting its significance in assuring Alito’s confirmation, 
i.e., there was no question that Alito would be confirmed once the judges 
had testified. In light of the perceived benefits of the testimony, one judge 
who had testified expressed hope that testimony from a panel of the 
nominee’s immediate judicial colleagues would become a regular part of the 
Supreme Court confirmation process, and many who had testified (as well 
as some who had not) stated a willingness to consider testifying at future 
confirmation hearings. 
One non-testifying judge observed that one’s evaluation of the 
testimony’s merits might come down in large part to one’s views of the 
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confirmation process itself. If, for example, one believed that Senators have 
already made up their minds by the time of a nominee’s hearing and are 
simply grand-standing for personal political gain, one would likely 
conclude that judges’ participation in the hearing would add nothing and 
could convey to the public that judges are more political than they 
otherwise appear to be. If, however, this judge continued, one believed that 
senators come to the confirmation hearing with open minds about a 
nominee and that judicial colleagues’ testimony can helpfully address 
senators’ questions about a nominee’s judicial demeanor and/or decision-
making process, then one would likely conclude that there is a valuable role 
for judges to play in testifying. One testifying judge said on this point that 
the hearing process had become so partisan and defensive that, if he had 
something positive to contribute to it, he would. 
Another non-testifying judge stated that he would be comfortable with 
judges testifying only if the confirmation process was itself non-partisan. In 
a non-partisan world, this judge observed, having judges speak to what only 
they can know of a nominee’s judicial demeanor, ability, “even whether the 
nominee was thoughtful or rushed to judgment,” would be invaluable. After 
all, this judge noted, colleagues are uniquely positioned to speak to these 
qualities and address the critical question of whether the nominee has the 
temperament to serve on the Supreme Court. In concluding our interview, 
this judge asked, “given how partisan the hearings currently are, should 
judges do this?,” and responded that it is questionable, given the 
testimony’s potential impact on public trust and confidence in the judiciary 
and perception of the judiciary’s partiality. 
Very few of the Third Circuit judges with whom I spoke were primarily 
critical of the practice of judges testifying at others’ judicial confirmation 
hearings although one non-testifying judge, who was largely opposed to 
judges testifying, observed that the news commentary following the judges’ 
appearance had sensitized the public and others to concern for the propriety 
of this type of testimony, making it unlikely that it would be repeated 
except in the rarest of circumstances. 
C. Potential for, and Desirability of, Negative Testimony by Judicial 
Colleagues 
Most of the judges with whom I spoke agreed that, pragmatically 
speaking, there would be a high bar to sitting judges testifying against the 
elevation of a colleague from their court because, if the nomination was 
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rejected, they would continue to serve together.44 One judge who had 
testified, and who was supportive of judges testifying, echoed many of the 
judges’ sentiments in saying that he would think “long and hard” before 
testifying against a colleague. Nevertheless, he noted that he might have an 
obligation to testify if he had knowledge of a nominee’s wrongdoing that 
had not been brought to light through other means. One judge who had 
testified did not think that there would be a higher bar to negative 
testimony. This judge did not think that judicial colleagues would be 
inhibited by a sense that you should not say anything if you cannot say 
something positive. Even assuming a high (or higher) bar to negative 
testimony, several judges who were supportive of judges testifying stated 
that the disincentives to negative testimony did not undermine the value or 
probity of positive testimony. 
One judge who had not testified and who was more ambivalent about 
judges testifying noted that negative information about a Supreme Court 
candidate would likely surface through other means—whether through 
testimony by other witnesses or leaks to the press—because it is likely that 
whatever negative information is apparent to a judicial colleague is also 
apparent to others outside of the judiciary. By contrast, a judge who had not 
testified and who was supportive of judges testifying suggested that there is 
a class of information known only to a nominee’s immediate colleagues that 
might serve as the basis for negative testimony by judges. As an example, 
this judge observed that only immediate judicial colleagues would know 
whether a nominee delegated a disproportionate amount of work to his or 
her law clerks. Other investigatory processes would not uncover it and other 
witnesses would not be able to testify about it. 
Asked about the possibility of “dueling” panels of judges from the same 
court testifying about a colleague nominated for elevation to the Supreme 
Court—including some panelists with positive assessments and some 
panelists with negative assessments—two judges who had testified 
responded that conflict is a good and healthy thing. One of these judges 
noted that it would be “fine” to have this type of conflict aired at a 
confirmation hearing, “just as we’ve seen it aired among academics.” The 
other judge observed that appellate courts already publish majority and 
dissenting opinions, thereby airing differences in public without any 
                                                                                                                            
44. See infra app. A. The two instances of testimony against a judicial nominee to date 
involved former judges from different courts than the nominee, specifically, former Ninth 
Circuit Judge Shirley Hufstedler at Judge Robert Bork’s hearing and former Sixth Circuit Judge 
Nathaniel Jones at Justice John Roberts’s hearing. Id. Note that former Judge Jones framed his 
testimony as raising concerns about, rather than directly opposing, Chief Justice Roberts’s 
confirmation. Id.  
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negative impact on the public’s perception of, and respect for, the judiciary. 
By contrast, one judge who had testified expressed concern for the potential 
of dueling panels of judges testifying given the lessened public perception 
of dignity that might result. This judge emphasized how important 
maintaining the public’s perception of the judiciary’s dignity was for 
promoting respect for, and compliance with, court judgments. 
D. Whether the Alito Panel Testimony Set a New Standard for Judicial 
Participation in Others’ Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings 
When asked whether the judges’ panel testimony set a new benchmark 
for judges testifying at others’ confirmation hearings, given the number of 
judges testifying at the Alito hearing,45 several judges stated that this was 
unlikely. One judge who had testified responded that he thought it 
“nonsense—this idea that Alito had five sitting colleagues and two former 
judges, then the next guy better have nine.” After all, this judge reasoned, 
the nominee does not control who or how many judges testify, but, rather, 
the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee and its ranking minority 
member do.46 Because it is not up to the candidate to invite witnesses, who 
or how many judges testify does not reflect on the merits of the candidate. 
E. Potential Impact of Judges’ Testimony on the ABA’s Role in Evaluating 
Judicial Nominees 
In asking about the potential impact of judicial testimony at other judges’ 
confirmation hearings on the ABA’s role in evaluating judicial nominees,47 
I heard a variety of responses. In brief, some judges observed that the 
judges’ live testimony filled a gap in the ABA’s evaluation process by 
                                                                                                                            
45. This point had been raised by commentator Nick Lewis in Gwen Ifill’s Washington 
Week coverage of the Alito hearing testimony (Jan. 2006). Although rejected as a concern by 
the judges with whom I spoke, this point was echoed by Alan Morrison when he noted a 
concern that future nominees might cite the Alito precedent in asking colleagues to testify. 
Morrison, supra note 5, at 297–99.  
46. See id. at 297. 
47. See infra notes 163–67 and accompanying text for details of the ABA’s judicial 
evaluation process. In brief, the ABA’s Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary conducts 
confidential interviews with many individuals familiar with the judicial nominee’s professional 
qualifications and reputation, including dozens of sitting federal judges. Id. The information 
gathered from these interviews is synthesized and reported on an anonymous basis both orally 
and in writing by the ABA Standing Committee to the Senate Judiciary Committee. See ABA 
STANDING COMM. ON THE FED. JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS 3 (2007), 
http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/federal_judiciary07.pdf [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMM.]. 
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addressing questions arising during the confirmation hearing itself.48 They 
also noted that the judges’ live testimony delved into questions more deeply 
than did the ABA interviews. Other judges noted that, in concentrating on 
the nominee’s professional qualifications and reputation, the ABA 
evaluation process had a different focus and objective than did the live 
testimony. Still, another judge, who had testified, noted that one of the 
advantages of live testimony was that it enabled judges to address a 
nominee’s wrongdoing, if any, when the ABA process failed to uncover 
such evidence. 
Recounting the judges’ responses in more detail, one judge who had 
testified emphasized that, if it is helpful to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee’s deliberations to have the ABA present information gleaned 
from its interviews with sitting judges, then it is by definition helpful for the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, as an inquisitorial body, to hear the judges’ 
views directly. Underscoring that the Senate confirmation hearing is the 
only public element of the judicial appointments process, this judge asserted 
that judges’ opinions of judicial candidates should not be restricted to the 
closed, confidential realm of the ABA evaluation process, but should be 
heard in the open forum of the Senate confirmation hearing so that the 
public can have greater knowledge of, and input into, the appointments 
process. 
Several judges (including those who had testified and those who had not) 
responded to questions about the testimony’s potential impact on the ABA’s 
role by analogizing the judges’ testimony to testifying at trial. One judge, in 
addressing the comparative merits of the live hearing testimony and 
confidential ABA evaluation process, stated that it is a question of whether 
you think presenting a report to the decision-makers is as useful as 
presenting live testimony. Echoing many of his colleagues in drawing on 
the trial metaphor, this judge, who had not testified, concluded that 
presenting live testimony likely has more of an impact than providing a 
confidential interview because live testimony resembles putting a witness 
on the stand and inviting cross-examination. 
One judge, out of concern for preserving the ABA’s role, suggested an 
alternative to both the judges’ live testimony and the current ABA process. 
His proposal was for the ABA to conduct more searching interviews with a 
nominee’s immediate judicial colleagues (if the nominee is a sitting judge) 
and report its findings in more detail to the Senate than this judge believes 
                                                                                                                            
48. These judges did not note in their interview comments that ABA Standing Committee 
representatives monitor a nominee’s confirmation hearing as the ABA representatives await 
their turn to testify to determine what, if any, changes to their prepared testimony might be 
needed.  
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is currently done. When presenting their oral report to the Senate 
committee, this judge, who had testified, noted that the ABA representatives 
could seek to answer the Committee’s questions about the judges’ interview 
statements in greater detail. Acknowledging that the judges’ confidential 
ABA interview statements would likely lose some of their immediacy in the 
Senate hearing’s question and answer format, and that there might well be 
hearsay-like problems with having ABA representatives field questions 
from the Senators about the judges’ interview statements, this judge 
suggested that it would nevertheless be worthwhile to explore this and other 
alternatives. 
IV. POTENTIAL JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IMPACTS OF JUDGES TESTIFYING AT 
OTHERS’ SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION HEARINGS 
One of my central concerns in undertaking this project was for potential 
negative impacts on judicial independence of judges testifying at others’ 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings. Here, “judicial independence” 
should be understood, not as a goal unto itself, but, rather, as a set of 
conditions enabling judges to resist constraints on their ability to decide 
cases impartially.49 Judicial independence is often conceptualized as 
composed of two strands—institutional and individual.50 Institutional 
independence, also called “procedural,” “administrative,” “structural,” 
and/or “branch” independence, connotes the judiciary’s ability in the 
aggregate to process cases and administer justice free from undue 
interference by the legislative and executive branches, while individual 
                                                                                                                            
49. I thank Russell Wheeler of the Brookings Institution for suggesting a variation on this 
definition of “judicial independence” (referencing a set of policy choices and conditions 
enabling judges to resist potential constraints). See Stephen B. Burbank et al., Reconsidering 
Judicial Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 9, 10 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002) 
(noting, “those responsible for the formal structures of government, and for the informal norms 
that fill up their interstices, do not seek whatever degree of independence they favor for the 
judiciary because they believe that judicial independence is itself normatively desirable. Rather, 
judicial independence is a means to an end (or, more probably, to more than one end).”); see 
also KATZMANN, supra note 12, at 39 (noting, “the Founders sought to create a system in which 
the independence of judges would be ensured. By providing for life tenure, they substantially 
isolated federal jurists from public pressure, giving them the freedom to make unpopular 
decisions.”).  
50. See CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE 
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF AMERICA’S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 9 (2006) [hereinafter GEYH, WHEN 
COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE]; see also Charles Gardner Geyh, Customary Independence, in 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH, supra note 
49, at 160, 162–63 [hereinafter Geyh, Customary Independence]. 
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independence, also called “decisional” independence, refers to individual 
judges’ authority to decide cases free from partiality.51 
Concern for the potential for judges’ confirmation hearing testimony 
enabling legislative interference in judicial decision-making was raised as 
early as Justice Rehnquist’s hearing to be Chief Justice.52 There, Justice 
Rehnquist “declined to talk about his own judicial opinions” on the grounds 
“that any such response would smack ‘of being called to account here 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee for a judicial act which I performed 
as a member of the Supreme Court of the United States.’”53 Observing that 
his opinions were available, explaining his reasoning, Rehnquist asserted 
that “how I came to that conclusion I think is something that I think ought 
not to be inquired into here.”54 Rehnquist’s concern for inappropriate Senate 
inquiry into judicial decision making applies with at least as much force to 
judges testifying about other judges’ decision making as it does to judges 
testifying about their own. 
To be sure, judicial independence concerns do not exist in a vacuum, but, 
rather, operate in a dynamic relationship with those for judicial 
accountability. Charles Geyh and others have written of this dynamism 
between judicial independence and accountability and of shifting 
understandings of judicial independence over time. Geyh uses the term 
“customary independence” to connote evolving customs, conventions, or 
norms that create a realm of autonomy for the judiciary. As Geyh puts it, 
“[c]ustomary independence refers to the zone of independence that 
Congress respects as a matter of custom when exercising its constitutional 
powers over courts and judges.”55 Michael Gerhardt has in turn observed 
how these evolving norms fill gaps in the “broad” constitutional framework 
governing judicial appointments.56 A question for this article then is 
whether customs or norms of judicial independence and accountability have 
evolved to such an extent that testimony by sitting federal judges at others’ 
judicial confirmation hearings is now considered an acceptable or even 
                                                                                                                            
51. GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra note 50, at 9. 
52. KATZMANN, supra note 12, at 27. 
53. Id. (quoting Hearings on the Nomination of Justice William H. Rehnquist to Be Chief 
Justice of the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 220 (1986)). 
54. Id. 
55. Geyh, Customary Independence, supra note 50, at 160, 162. 
56. MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 338 (2000) (“With respect to federal appointments, the relevant 
constitutional structure merely provides the broad outlines within which significant informal 
arrangements or norms have developed among presidents, senators, interest groups, the media, 
nominees, and others.”). 
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expected part of the Supreme Court appointment process? The answer, as I 
seek to demonstrate in the discussion that follows, is no. 
A. The Judges’ Interview Comments on Potential Judicial Independence 
Effects 
When asked about the potential for judges testifying at others’ judicial 
confirmation hearings to undermine judicial independence, several Third 
Circuit judges with whom I spoke (including those who were supportive of 
and those who were ambivalent about the testimony) responded that they 
were not terribly concerned about the testimony’s potential impacts on 
judicial independence because a judge could ably determine what questions 
he or she would address in their testimony, and in response to Senate 
questioning, and thereby minimize any potential negative effects. 
One judge, who had testified, noted that he could imagine a time when 
Senate questioning might be less deferential to, or respectful of, judge-
witnesses than that seen at the Alito hearing. If that time were to arrive, this 
judge declared that it would be totally unacceptable to have “toe-to-toe” 
wrestling between the legislature and the judiciary over a nominee because 
of the damage to the public’s perception of the judiciary’s dignity that 
would likely result. If Senate questioning of judge-witnesses became less 
respectful, this judge would “pull the plug” on judges testifying at others’ 
judicial confirmation hearings. Until that time, he would consider testifying 
again, at least in part because he thought the judges’ testimony helped 
educate the American public about the judicial process and what qualifies 
someone to be a good judge. 
Shifting from concern for effects on the judiciary writ large to potential 
impacts on individual judges’ autonomy, I asked the judges about possible 
consequences that anticipation of testimony by one or more colleagues at a 
future elevation hearing might have on a judge’s conduct. The judges were 
nearly unanimous in responding that no judge “worth his or her salt” would 
alter his or her judicial behavior with the prospect of a future elevation 
hearing in mind. When asked more specifically whether a court of appeals 
judge might alter his or her behavior on the bench, or with colleagues at 
post-argument conferences, or in positions taken in opinions (including 
whether to write dissenting opinions) in anticipation of testimony by 
colleagues at a subsequent elevation hearing, the judges again said it was 
unlikely. One judge who had testified responded that, even though most, if 
not all, active court of appeals judges hope, or think of, themselves as 
prospective Supreme Court candidates, it is unlikely that anyone would 
change his or her behavior with Supreme Court nomination in mind. After 
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all, observed this judge, the court of appeals is a small universe, and it is 
unlikely for judges to act that way. Another judge who had not testified said 
that the possibility of Supreme Court appointment is so remote that most 
court of appeals judges do not aspire to it. Therefore, the possibility of 
colleagues testifying at a judge’s subsequent elevation hearing and its 
potential impact on judicial behavior is a non-issue. Yet another judge noted 
that judges might be tempted to modify how they framed and wrote 
opinions (though not the outcomes reached) with an eye to Supreme Court 
appointment, but that the potential for colleagues’ testimony would not 
affect this phenomenon. Rather, this judge observed that judges known to 
be on the short list for Supreme Court appointment might modify how they 
wrote opinions with selection by appointment officials, and not colleagues’ 
possible testimony, in mind. 
 B. Institutional Independence Concerns 
Testimony by sitting judges at others’ Article III confirmation hearings 
presents concerns for the judiciary’s institutional independence as well as 
for inter-branch comity and separation of powers more generally. When 
judges testify about the merits of other judicial candidates, senators, both 
individually and collectively, are placed in an awkward position in terms of 
how best to evaluate the judges’ testimony.57 Should or could senators press 
the judge-witnesses for verification, or elaboration, of the matters testified 
to, as they would with other witnesses? Or would doing so trample on 
judicial confidentiality? Should or could senators reject or discount the 
judges’ testimony as insufficiently probative of the nominee’s fitness for 
office in recognition of the incentives for positive testimony (noted in Part 
III, above), or would that undermine institutional comity?58 
                                                                                                                            
57. See Tony Mauro, Judges Turn Witnesses for Alito: Unusual Endorsement Sparks 
Worries About Politicization of Bench, Possible Recusals, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 16, 2006, 
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/dc/PubArticleDC.jsp?id=900005444882. 
58. In addressing the judges’ Alito hearing testimony in an essay on judges and politics, 
Alan Morrison raised similar questions in depicting Senators’ responses to a hypothetical judge 
testifying at a colleague’s elevation hearing. See Morrison, supra note 5, at 297–98. Morrison 
wrote:  
After hearing favorable testimony, none of which is likely to be very specific, 
a senator would ask a question such as, “Judge, can you give us an example 
of a case that illustrates the proposition that the nominee is open-minded and 
changes his views when presented with strong contrary arguments?” 
Id. Morrison noted, “[t]he judge surely would, and should, refuse to supply such specifics, if 
there are any, because to do so would violate the sanctity of the judges’ conference.” Id. at 298. 
Morrison continued: “If such a scenario took place in a courtroom, with an ordinary witness, the 
witness could not refuse to answer, or if he did, his prior testimony would be stricken,” and 
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Beyond the awkwardness that such testimony presents for Senators, 
testimony by judges at others’ Article III confirmation hearings has the 
potential to present separation of powers problems by involving individual 
judges and the judiciary in assisting Senators and the Senate in evaluating 
judicial candidates.59 Problems may arise if the judge-witnesses comment 
on individual case decisions or types of decisions by a candidate and 
thereby assist the Senate in evaluating the candidate’s decision-making 
process, where it is the Senate’s, and not the judiciary’s, responsibility to 
evaluate the nominee’s qualifications for office. Judicial testimony may also 
jeopardize the separation of powers by involving judges in weighing in on 
inherently political questions of how best to evaluate judicial nominees, 
e.g., what criteria to apply, including whether a nominee’s ideology should 
be considered.60 These are questions committed to the executive and 
legislative branches.61 Moreover, judicial testimony at others’ confirmation 
hearings runs the risk of exposing to Senate (and public) scrutiny what 
should properly be confidential judicial branch operations. Many of these 
concerns would become even more pressing if Senate questioning of judge-
witnesses became more challenging and less respectful than that seen to 
date. 
Of course, judges already interact with Congress, including through the 
presentation of testimony,62 and separation of powers principles do not 
dictate that the branches cannot interact. Indeed, the governing code of 
                                                                                                                            
asked, “[w]hat would happen in the Senate? Would the committee, and the remaining senators 
who were not on the committee, be instructed to disregard the testimony of the judges, or would 
the judges be compelled to violate their rules of confidentiality?” Id. “Either way,” Morrison 
concluded, “the situation would be quite awkward, with the need for information to test the 
statements made in support of the nominee on one side and the need to guard the confidentiality 
of communications between judges regarding their cases on the other.” Id.  
59.  See Mauro, supra note 57, at 13. 
60. Dorf, supra note 4. 
61. See, e.g., id. This formulation of the issue begs the question whether judges 
inappropriately weigh in on political questions if invited to do so by a Senate committee, as in 
the Alito hearing. See Alito Hearing, supra note 17, at 654–81. In other words, has any branch 
trampled on any other branch’s domain under these circumstances? The judges were invited, 
and they welcomed the invitation. Thus, it could be argued that the invitation to testify, and the 
resulting testimony, reflect cooperation, not interference. 
62. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, Paradigm Found: Redefining the 
Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1172 n.20 (1996) (citing 
Maeva Marcus & Emily Field Van Tassel, Judges and Legislators in the New Federal System, 
1789–1800, in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 31, 36–42 (Robert 
A. Katzmann ed., 1988) (discussing interaction between judges, Congress, and the president in 
the 1790s)); Harvey Rishikof & Barbara A. Perry, “Separateness but Interdependence, 
Autonomy but Reciprocity”: A First Look at Federal Judges’ Appearances Before Legislative 
Committees, 46 MERCER L. REV. 667, 671, 679–80 (1995) (compiling and classifying 
congressional testimony by sitting judges).  
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conduct authorizes judicial testimony about matters of judicial expertise, 
including judicial administration,63 and court-Congress interactions have 
been encouraged by judges, legislators, and academic commentators as a 
healthy and productive enterprise, leading to greater mutual understanding 
and improved efficacy of each branch.64 Thus, the question is not whether 
there will, or should, be court-Congress interaction, but, rather, as Geyh and 
Katzmann and others frame it, what parameters should govern such 
interactions.65  
Aside from the confirmation hearing testimony noted in Part II and 
Appendix A, judges’ congressional testimony to date has focused on the 
judiciary’s budget, number of judgeships and their allocation, revisions to 
civil and criminal procedural rules, and enactment of, or amendments to, 
substantive law. While all of these matters of judicial testimony can be 
contentious, they are different in kind from judges weighing in on the merits 
of individual judicial appointments. As Terri Peretti and others have 
observed, the judicial appointment process is overtly political, and indeed, 
overtly partisan:  
Although some may find it abhorrent, the process by which federal 
judges, especially Supreme Court justices, are recruited and 
selected is highly political. Judges are not recruited and chosen 
through a civil service system emphasizing merit, as in some 
European legal systems, but through a political process controlled 
by politicians and emphasizing partisanship and ideology.66 
Because the judicial appointment process is inherently political (with 
executive and legislative powers intentionally at play)67 and overtly 
partisan, and because the Constitution specifically reserves the judicial 
appointment power to the executive and legislative branches,68 it is 
especially concerning from an institutional well-being and inter-branch 
                                                                                                                            
63. See discussion infra Part V. 
64. See generally KATZMANN, supra note 12 (proposing, as appropriate, greater interaction 
between courts and Congress, for example, judicial notification to Congress of statutory errors 
or omissions). 
65. Geyh, supra note 62, at 1239 (Geyh cautions that “the problem for the future is not 
that judges will fail to communicate with Congress. The problem is that they may communicate 
too much or in such a way as to appear self-interested to a Congress and public predisposed to 
second-guess the motives of government officials in the aftermath of Watergate . . . .”); see 
generally KATZMANN, supra note 12. 
66. TERRI J. PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 85 (1999). 
67. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. (stating that the President shall appoint judges with 
advice and consent of Senate); see also WITTES, supra note 1, at 130 (observing that “the 
Framers of the Constitution designed a system that involved the two political branches of 
government”). 
68. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 3, at 974.  
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comity perspective that sitting judges are injected, and/or are injecting 
themselves, into the heat of the confirmation process. While the judicial 
conduct code authorizes judges to “participate in the process of judicial 
selection by . . . responding to official inquiries concerning a person being 
considered for a judgeship,”69 judicial testimony at others’ Article III 
confirmation hearings goes beyond merely responding to inquiries when it 
takes positions in favor of or against nominees. Judges should not pass 
judgment on judicial nominees because this is a function reserved for the 
executive and legislative branches. Rather, judges should desist from 
testifying to safeguard the well-being of the courts and the three-branch 
system. 
C. Individual Independence Concerns 
In addition to the testimony’s implications for institutional independence 
and inter-branch comity lie possible threats to individual judges’ autonomy. 
Here, the principal concern is for the extent to which individual judicial 
behavior may be adversely affected by a judge’s awareness that his or her 
current (and former) judicial colleagues may volunteer, or be called on, to 
testify if the judge is nominated for elevation to a higher court. Will the job 
performance or manner of judges contemplating elevation be affected by a 
desire to gain colleagues’ favorable reviews, or avoid colleagues’ criticism 
(whether consciously or not)? Does an apparent need for circumspection 
already exist for those aspiring to higher judgeships, irrespective of the 
potential for public testimony by fellow judges, where judges already talk 
with executive and legislative branch officials and ABA representatives 
about the merits of individual nominees?70 Put more directly, are judges 
with aspirations for higher office, and/or those known to be on the short list 
for the Supreme Court, already aware of the need to be circumspect around 
their colleagues out of concern that things they say or do may be divulged 
privately, such that the possibility of, indeed, the perceived need for, public 
testimony by judicial colleagues does nothing to alter this reality? Does the 
public nature of confirmation hearing testimony render it sufficiently 
different in kind that it has a more powerful, and more damaging, effect on 
individual judicial autonomy? This is a question for further empirical 
research. Among the questions framed by the potential impact of public 
testimony on individual judicial behavior are: for the prevalence of judicial 
                                                                                                                            
69. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 2B cmt. (Proposed Revised Code Feb. 29, 
2008); see infra Part V.B. 
70. See discussion infra Part VI. 
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ambition,71 for the degree to which judges are affected by awareness of 
fellow judges’ opinions of them,72 and for the importance of the forum in 
which colleagues’ opinions might be expressed, whether public or private. 
What we do know is that where a judge’s confirmation hearing 
constitutes the point in time when he or she is most vulnerable to Senate 
scrutiny and least independent,73 testimony by other judges implicates the 
judiciary, both individually and collectively, in a lessened observation of 
judicial autonomy, with individual as well as institutional ramifications. 
V. THE TESTIMONY’S PERMISSIBILITY UNDER THE GOVERNING JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT CODE 
Concern for the conduct code permissibility of judges’ testimony at 
others’ judicial confirmation hearings had been raised by Senate committee 
members as early as Rehnquist’s confirmation hearing to be Associate 
Justice. At that time, Senator Birch Bayh flagged concern for the ethical 
propriety of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s seeking Judge Craig’s 
opinion of Rehnquist: “[T]his morning I had said to my staff I would really 
like to talk to Walter Craig, but I didn’t think it was ethical for me to 
approach him because he now sits as a distinguished member of the Federal 
                                                                                                                            
71. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 57 (1997); see also 
LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 81 
(2006). Baum has considered this question of judicial ambition and its impact on judicial 
decision-making at some length. See id. Noting, “[t]he federal courts provide a good setting in 
which to consider ambition for judicial promotions,” Baum writes, “[p]resumably, the great 
majority of judges would happily accept a promotion: ‘Every magistrate judge is a district judge 
in waiting; every district judge is a circuit judge in waiting; every circuit judge is an associate 
justice in waiting.’” Id. (citations omitted). According to Baum, “one federal judge said about 
those who want promotions: ‘they know their votes are being watched, their decisions are being 
analyzed.’ Thus ambitious judges [in the federal system] have reason to think about the 
relationship between their choices in cases and their prospects for promotions.” Id. (citation 
omitted). Of course, this might be all the more true if judges anticipate colleagues testifying 
about them at subsequent confirmation hearings. 
72. This second question has been insufficiently studied to date, though a burgeoning 
literature on intra-panel decision making and factors that affect appellate judicial outcomes is 
developing. See, e.g., VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: 
INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING (Greg Ivers & Kevin T. McGuire eds., 
2006). 
73. According to Geyh, Congress has “experimented with a variety of means to control 
court decision making, eventually jettisoning them as antithetical to judicial independence.” 
GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE, supra note 50, at 11. Geyh observes, “the 
appointments process—which had always been highly politicized and comparatively 
unrestrained—emerged as the one remaining viable mechanism that would allow Congress to 
influence judicial decision making.” Id. Thus, judicial appointments became “the battlefield of 
choice for [congressional] control of the courts.” Id. 
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judiciary in Arizona.”74 Several senators likewise raised concern for the 
ethical propriety of sitting judges testifying in support of judicial nominees 
at Judge Bork’s 1987 hearing to be Associate Justice.75 
As for whether the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges76 permits judges’ 
testimony at others’ judicial confirmation hearings, the answer is far from 
clear. While some Code provisions appear to allow, if not encourage, this 
testimony, others arguably counsel against it.77 What is clear is that the 
                                                                                                                            
74. See generally Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 180 (1971). 
75. During former Chief Justice Warren Burger’s testimony in support of Bork’s 
confirmation, Senator Dennis DeConcini solicited Burger’s thoughts on the ethics of judges 
addressing the merits of individual judicial appointments, asking, “[d]o you feel that it is proper 
for a judge to make public statements or if not, is there a proper way for them to express their 
views?” Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 2108 (1987). When 
Burger replied that each judge must decide for him or herself, DeConcini asked whether there 
were any guidelines or standards governing judges’ testimony about other judicial nominees. Id. 
Without referencing relevant judicial conduct codes, Burger replied, “I think it is up to each 
judge, Senator.” Id.  
Senator Hubert Humphrey also questioned Burger on the ethics of judges testifying at 
others’ judicial confirmation hearings, observing, “I find it remarkable that a retired Chief 
Justice would even involve himself in such a controversy. I do not know if there is precedent for 
that, but it is certainly a remarkable thing.” Id. at 2114. Burger interjected, “I do not feel as 
though I am involved in a controversy, Senator, if I may interrupt you. I feel I am simply 
expressing views as a citizen. Now if that draws me into a controversy, so be it.” Id. 
76. The Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges was adopted in 1973 by the Judicial Conference 
of the United States, the federal judiciary’s standards and policy-setting body. See 69 F.R.D. 
273 (1973). The Judicial Conference proposed a revised code on February 29, 2008, for which 
the comment period has closed. Though the newly revised code has not been finally adopted, I 
cite to its revised language and numbering in this Part.  
The Code of Conduct is considered “the law with respect to the ethical obligations of federal 
judges,” United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 113 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and governs all 
Article III judges below the Supreme Court level. See generally JAMES ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT AND ETHICS (4th ed. 2007). Compliance with the judicial conduct code is evaluated 
according to a reasonable person standard and consistent with applicable federal law. Id. The 
official Commentary to Canon 1 instructs, “[t]he Canons are rules of reason. They should be 
applied consistent with constitutional requirements, statutes, other court rules, and decisional 
law, and in the context of all relevant circumstances.” CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES 
Canon 1 cmt. (Proposed Revised Code Feb. 29, 2008); see generally Leslie W. Abramson, 
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 949, 953–57 (1996). 
77. See, e.g., KATZMANN, supra note 12, at 87 (observing that “[a]ny review of [the 
Conduct Code’s] provisions . . . highlights its limited utility in the context of judicial-legislative 
relations”). Katzmann continued:  
They [the conduct code provisions] do not expressly deal with judicial 
interaction with Congress, with the full range of circumstances in which 
judges and legislators interact, directly and indirectly. The canons do not 
consider how such variables as substance and form, conjoining in a 
multiplicity of ways, affect the propriety of communication.  
Id. at 89. 
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Code applies only to sitting judges, including active and senior judges, and 
not to those who have resigned from the bench. Thus, the Code analysis set 
forth in Parts B and C below applies to some but not all of the judges who 
have testified at others’ Supreme Court confirmation hearings to date.78 
A. The Judges’ Interview Comments on the Testimony’s Permissibility 
Under the Governing Conduct Code 
In speaking with the judges about the permissibility of judges’ 
confirmation hearing testimony, I was interested, first, in verifying Senator 
Specter’s statement to the press at the time of the Alito hearing that Judge 
Becker and his colleagues had consulted, prior to agreeing to appear before 
the Committee, on the conduct code permissibility of judges testifying at 
others’ confirmation hearings.79 The interviews made clear that Judge 
Becker had engaged in an ethics consultation before the panel testimony 
was presented and had been assured that the testimony was permissible 
under the governing code.80 
                                                                                                                            
78. The conduct code does not apply to any of the former judges who have testified at 
others’ judicial confirmation hearings, including former Judges Gibbons and Lewis at Justice 
Alito’s hearing. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES cmt. Compliance with the Code of 
Conduct (Proposed Revised Code Feb. 29, 2008). 
79. Media Stakeout, supra note 42, at 2 (reporting that, when asked whether there was 
“ever any question as to whether [the Third Circuit judges’] testimony met their canon of 
ethics?,” Specter responded, “[n]o, I don't think so . . . . Judge Becker first thought about 
testifying as character witnesses in criminal trials, and analogized it. And even there they can 
testify if they're -- so long as they're not volunteers, if they're subpoenaed. So -- and then, when 
there was research further -- and these judges are very careful people and they know their 
canons, and I know that they went into it in meticulous, scrupulous detail to make a 
determination as to the propriety of what they're doing.”). 
80. I do not know whether Judge Becker sought an official advisory opinion on the 
propriety of the testimony from the Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct. The 
Judicial Conference began issuing advisory opinions on questions of judicial ethics in 1970. See 
Andrew Lievense & Avern Cohn, The Federal Judiciary and the ABA Model Code: The Parting 
of the Ways, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 276 (2007). Its Committee on Codes of Conduct continues to 
do so in response to anonymous queries by sitting judges seeking guidance on the permissibility 
of particular conduct by judges and/or judicial personnel. Some, but not all, of the Committee’s 
advisory opinions are publicly available “on issues frequently raised or issues of broad 
application.” See U.S. Courts: The Federal Judiciary, Published Advisory Opinions, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/advisoryopinions.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2009). The Committee 
can also respond to ethics questions informally, without published opinions. 
The Committee’s published advisory opinions are an important resource for understanding 
the judicial conduct code, though they are not binding on courts. See, e.g., Draper v. Reynolds, 
369 F.3d 1270, 1280 (11th Cir. 2004) (“This Court is not bound by the opinions of the 
Committee on Judicial Codes of Conduct. In the past, however, courts have considered those 
opinions to some extent.”). 
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When asked more broadly whether testimony by judges at others’ 
judicial confirmation hearings (whether positive, negative, or both) is 
permissible under the governing conduct code, one judge who had not 
testified responded that the Code instructs judges to testify on matters of 
judicial administration and that nothing is more critical to judicial 
administration than the confirmation of judges. In light of this provision, 
this judge concluded that judges should be able to testify at one anothers’ 
confirmation hearings in conformity with the Code. Another judge who had 
testified stated that it was not “even a close question as to whether a judge 
can testify regarding judicial nominees because the ABA has asked him 
every year since he was appointed” about judicial candidates. This judge 
also stated that the judges’ testimony was not character testimony, and that 
the prohibition on voluntary character testimony applied only in the trial 
context.81 
Striking more of a cautionary note, one judge who had testified observed 
that the testimony might have approached the line on the Code’s prohibition 
on judges’ involvement in political activity when the judges addressed 
Alito’s viewpoints on certain issues and expressed opinions more generally 
on whether a candidate’s ideology should be taken into account by the 
Senate.82 
On the specific question of whether Alito, once confirmed to the 
Supreme Court, might need to recuse himself from considering cases 
participated in by his testifying and/or non-testifying colleagues, several of 
the judges (testifiers as well as non-testifiers) declared the issue “bunk” and 
“ridiculous.” One judge, who had not testified and who largely opposed 
judges testifying at others’ hearings, stated that Senator Leahy’s articulated 
concern for Alito’s recusal need was not the real problem with the 
testimony. Rather, the real problem, for this judge, was the overtly political 
nature of the judges’ panel. 
                                                                                                                            
No advisory opinion on the permissibility of this type of testimony has been published on 
the Judicial Conference’s website, see U.S. Courts: The Federal Judiciary, Published Advisory 
Opinions, http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/advisoryopinions.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2009), but 
not all of the Committee’s advisory opinions are made public. 
81. See infra Part V.C for a detailed discussion. 
82. See Dorf, supra note 4 (noting that Dorf labeled the latter issue an explicitly political 
one). 
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B. Conduct Code Provisions Arguably Authorizing or Encouraging 
Judges’ Testimony at Others’ Article III Confirmation Hearings 
Turning specifically to the terms of the relevant conduct code provisions, 
Canon 4’s authorization of judges’ legislative and executive branch activity, 
including testimony, on matters of judicial expertise, including judicial 
administration, provides the strongest argument in support of judges 
testifying at others’ judicial confirmation hearings and was cited by Senator 
Specter, Senator Cornyn, and Judge Becker at Alito’s confirmation hearing 
as so doing.83 Specifically, Canon 4(A)(2) provides, 
A judge may appear at a public hearing before, or otherwise 
consult with, an executive or legislative body or official: (a) on 
matters concerning the law, the legal system, or the administration 
of justice; (b) to the extent that it would generally be perceived 
that a judge’s judicial experience provides special expertise in the 
area . . . .84  
Canon 4’s official Commentary sheds light on the considerations 
animating this provision when it observes that a judge, as a “person 
specially learned in the law . . . is in a unique position to contribute to the 
law, the legal system, and the administration of justice, including revision 
of substantive and procedural law and improvement of criminal and 
juvenile justice.”85 To the extent time allows and impartiality is not 
compromised, “the judge is encouraged to [contribute to the law], either 
independently or through a bar association, judicial conference, or other 
organization dedicated to the improvement of the law.”86 
Though Canon 4(A)(2)’s reference to judges speaking at public hearings 
on matters of judicial expertise has come to be understood largely in terms 
of testimony on matters of judicial resources, including budget and number 
of judgeships, and on matters of civil and criminal procedure and even of 
substantive law,87 it is certainly arguable that Canon 4(A)(2) extends to 
testimony regarding judicial nominees. Providing guidance on Canon 4’s 
authorization to testify is the Judicial Conference Codes of Conduct 
Committee’s Advisory Opinion No. 50 (“Opinion 50”). Entitled, “A 
                                                                                                                            
83. Alito Hearing, supra note 17, at 678–80. 
84. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 4(A)(2) (Proposed Revised Code Feb. 29, 
2008). 
85. Id. 
86. Id.  
87. See, e.g., Rishikof & Perry, supra note 62, at 683 (inventorying these appearances). As 
Perry and Rishikof document, federal judges have testified regularly before Congress on matters 
of judicial budget, allocation of judgeships, amendment of procedural rules, and merits of 
proposed legislation. Id. at 680–82. 
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Judge’s Appearance Before a Legislative or Executive Body or Official,”88 
Opinion 50 notes, “[t]he Committee is of the view that under Canon 4 it is 
clear that a judge properly may appear before a legislative or executive 
body or official, at a public hearing or in private consultation, with respect 
to matters concerning the administration of justice.”89 The opinion lists 
matters subject to Canon 4 testimony as those “relating to court personnel, 
budget, equipment, housing, and procedures,” and notes, “[t]hese are all 
vital for the judiciary’s housekeeping functions and for the smooth 
operation of the dispensation of justice generally.”90 The opinion continues: 
“This much is clear.”91 Whether the opinion provides support for judges 
testifying at others’ judicial confirmation hearings is not so clear. More 
specifically, whether the reference to testimony on court personnel 
encompasses testimony on the merits of judicial nominees is uncertain, 
where the reference has been understood to date as relating to the need for, 
and optimal allocation of, judgeships and not the particularities of 
individual appointments. 
Opinion 50 articulates two conditions that must be satisfied before a 
judge can appear before a legislative or executive body. These are: “when 
(1) the hearing is public and (2) the subject matter reasonably may be 
considered to merit the attention and comment of a judge as a judge, and not 
merely as an individual.”92 Given the judges’ testimony’s compliance with 
condition (1), the question under Opinion 50 is whether the merits of a 
proposed Supreme Court appointment may reasonably be understood as 
calling for “the attention and comment of a judge as a judge, and not merely 
as an individual,”93 in satisfaction of condition (2). 
At the same time, the Committee’s Advisory Opinion No. 93 (“Opinion 
93”) cautions against judicial involvement in activity that uses the law to 
promote social, political, or civic objectives.94 Observing that “[n]ot every 
activity that involves the law or the legal system is considered a Canon 4 
activity,” Opinion 93 clarifies:  
                                                                                                                            
88. A Judge’s Appearance Before a Legislative or Executive Body or Official, Comm. on 
Codes of Conduct, Advisory Op. 50 (adopted Aug. 15, 1977; revised Jan. 16, 1998), available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/50.html. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Extrajudicial Activities Under Canons 4 and 5, Comm. on Codes of Conduct, 
Advisory Op. 93 (adopted Apr. 25, 1997; revised Oct. 27, 1998), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/93.html [hereinafter Extrajudicial Activities Op.]. 
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[T]o qualify as a Canon 4 activity, the activity must be directed 
toward the objective of improving the law, qua law, or improving 
the legal system or administration of justice, and not merely 
utilizing the law or the legal system as a means to achieve an 
underlying social, political, or civic objective.95 
Taking Opinions 50 and 93 together, the question under condition (2) of 
Opinion 50 becomes whether a judge’s testimony on the merits of a 
particular Supreme Court candidate is testimony by a judge qua judge (and 
not qua individual) on the law qua law (and not qua politics). Echoing this 
formulation, Opinion 93 notes that judicial testimony on matters of law, the 
legal system, and the administration of justice have traditionally been 
understood narrowly, with two dominant  formulations: “[f]irst, we have 
described the phrase ‘improve the law’ as ‘being limited to the kinds of 
matters a judge, by virtue of [the judge’s] judicial experience, is uniquely 
qualified to address.’”96 Second, after ensuring that the testimony is 
provided in the judge’s capacity as a judge and not as an individual, “we 
look to see if the beneficiary of the activity is the law or legal system 
itself.”97 
Applying the first formulation to the Third Circuit judges’ Alito hearing 
testimony, Judge Becker and his colleagues specifically framed their 
testimony as judges, indeed as the nominee’s immediate judicial colleagues, 
in establishing their basis of expertise on then-Judge Alito’s fitness for 
higher office. Reasonable minds may differ, however, on whether judges’ 
testimony in this context is on the law qua law or qua politics. There are 
certainly ways in which testimony about the merits of a judicial nominee is 
testimony about the law, e.g., about the nominee’s understanding of the role 
of law and courts in regulating human relations. But, there are also ways in 
which testimony on the merits of a judicial nominee is testimony about law 
qua politics. Insofar as the testimony relates to the interaction between law 
and public policy or is predictive of likely impacts on public policy 
outcomes of a particular appointment, it may be understood as relating to 
politics. 
Applying the second formulation, it is arguable whether the 
“beneficiary” of testimony on the merits of a particular nominee is the law 
or legal system itself.98 Opinion 93’s examples of appropriate Canon 4 
                                                                                                                            
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 293 (LexisNexis 
Matthew Bender Publishing 2007) (1990). Jeffrey Shaman helps shed light on the purpose 
behind the ABA’s then-parallel Canon 4 authorization of judicial testimony on matters of 
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activity are markedly different in kind from judges testifying at others’ 
judicial confirmation hearings. They include participation in “an 
educational videotape to improve the quality of court reporters,” 
participation in “a not-for-profit organization to promote the concept of the 
resolution of disputes through arbitration,” participation in “an organization 
that researches and provides information on the juvenile justice system,” 
and so on.99 Under this formulation of the Canon 4 test, it is unclear whether 
judges testifying at others’ judicial confirmation hearings complies with the 
Code. 
Lastly with regard to Code provisions arguably supporting presentation 
of this type of testimony, Canon 2(B)’s official Commentary specifically 
allows judges to “respond[] to official inquiries concerning a person being 
considered for a judgeship” despite its prohibition on use of prestige of 
judicial office to further the judge’s or others’ private interests.100 The 
question becomes whether responding to official inquiries “concerning a 
person being considered for a judgeship” includes testifying at another’s 
judicial confirmation hearing? 
 In a related fashion, Advisory Opinion No. 59 (“Opinion 59”), subtitled 
“Propriety of a Judge Giving Evaluation of Judicial Candidate to Screening 
or Appointing Authority,” notes that Canon 2(B) bars a judge from 
initiating advocacy on behalf of a friend or acquaintance for judicial 
appointment,101 but that, following from the 2(B) Commentary, “there 
would be no impropriety in a judge’s answering a proper inquiry from an 
appointing officer with respect to the judge’s knowledge concerning the 
character and fitness of a candidate for appointment to any public office, 
including that of judge.”102 Opinion 59 cautions against “pleading for a 
candidate of the judge’s choosing in opposition to others under 
consideration” and states that a “judge should not lend his or her name to 
any publicity campaign for any candidate.”103 While judges who testify at 
                                                                                                                            
judicial expertise, noting, “[t]he exception for bodies concerned with improvement of the law is 
necessary in order to allow jurists, who, after all, possess the most experience in administering 
the judicial system, to participate in state and national efforts aimed at upgrading the system of 
justice.” Id.  
99. Extrajudicial Activities Op., supra note 94. 
100. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 2 cmt. Canon 2(B) (Proposed Revised 
Code Feb. 29, 2008). 
101. Propriety of a Judge Giving Evaluation of Judicial Candidate to Screening or 
Appointing Authority, Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Op. 59 (adopted April 16, 1979; 
revised July 10, 1998), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/59.html. 
102. Id. Similarly, Advisory Opinion No. 59 notes that judges may “respond affirmatively 
to requests from or on behalf of the appointing authorities to evaluate candidates insofar as the 
judge’s knowledge of the candidates permits.” Id. 
103. Id. 
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another’s judicial confirmation hearing do not plead the individual 
nominee’s candidacy in opposition to other candidates, their testimony is 
reasonably understood as lending their names, positions, and reputations to 
support (or oppose, as relevant) a particular candidate, as actually happened 
at Justice Alito’s and others’ hearings. Additionally, because Supreme 
Court confirmation hearings are broadcast live and covered widely in the 
media, it is readily anticipatable that judges’ testimony would generate 
public attention, even if not self-consciously framed as a publicity 
campaign. 
C. Conduct Code Provisions Arguably Counseling Against Judges’ 
Testimony at Others’ Article III Confirmation Hearings 
Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges,104 exhorting judges to 
uphold the independence and integrity of the judiciary, and its official 
Commentary105 make clear the Code’s grounding in concern for preserving 
judicial independence and safeguarding the public’s trust and confidence in 
the courts. Testimony by judges at others’ judicial confirmation hearings 
risks exposing the judiciary to pressures from other entities involved in the 
appointments process, thereby raising concern for the perceived and actual 
integrity of the judiciary. Judicial testimony also creates at least the 
appearance of judges attempting to influence the confirmation process by 
using the prestige of judicial office. 
Canon 2 exhorts judges, inter alia, to safeguard the actuality and 
appearance of propriety.106 The Canon’s official Commentary helps shed 
light on this directive by underscoring, as in Canon 1, the importance of 
                                                                                                                            
104. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 1 (Proposed Revised Code Feb. 29, 2008) 
(providing, “[a]n independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. 
A judge should . . . personally observe those [high] standards [of conduct], so that the integrity 
and independence of the judiciary may be preserved.”). 
105. Id. Canon 1 cmt. (observing “[d]eference to the judgments and rulings of courts 
depends upon public confidence in the integrity and independence of judges. . . . Although 
judges should be independent, they should comply with the law, as well as the provisions of this 
Code. Public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary is maintained by the adherence of 
each judge to this responsibility. Conversely, violation of this Code diminishes public 
confidence in the judiciary and thereby does injury to the system of government under law.”). 
106. Id. Canon 2. Canon 2 instructs: 
(A) A judge should . . . act at all times in a manner that promotes public 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. (B) . . . A judge 
should not lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private 
interests of the judge or others . . . . A judge should not testify voluntarily as 
a character witness. 
Id. 
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“[p]ublic confidence in the judiciary.”107 The Commentary also makes clear 
that “judge[s] must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny.”108 
As a result, “judge[s] must . . . accept restrictions that might be viewed as 
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and 
willingly.”109 
Canon 2’s next exhortation to judges, to safeguard the actuality and 
appearance of impartiality,110 arguably applies with even greater force than 
concern for propriety, where impartiality is central to the public’s 
expectations for its judges.111 Judges testifying in favor of or against judicial 
colleagues arguably engage in actual partial behavior and certainly risk the 
appearance of judicial partiality, i.e., that judges favor (or disfavor in the 
case of opposing testimony) particular individuals and even particular 
policy outcomes associated with those individuals. 
Next, in understanding how Canon 2(B)’s prohibition on use of prestige 
of judicial office to further another’s private interests applies to the question 
of judges testifying at others’ judicial confirmation hearings, it is important 
to consider whether judicial testimony under these circumstances promotes 
a nominee’s private interests (e.g., in career advancement or prestige of 
position), or whether such testimony should instead be understood as 
relating to matters of overriding public, and not private, interest concerned 
with law interpretation and the judicial process. The answer may well be 
that judicial testimony under such circumstances involves both. A recent 
example of seemingly improper, although not ultimately censured, use of 
the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of another 
involved Texas Supreme Court Justice Nathan Hecht’s provision of more 
than 120 press interviews in support of Harriet Miers’ failed Supreme Court 
nomination.112 The Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct recommended 
Hecht’s censure for violating Texas’ Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2(B), 
paralleling the U.S. judicial conduct code in prohibiting the use of “the 
prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or 
                                                                                                                            
107. See generally supra note 106; CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 2 cmt. 
Canon 2(A) (Proposed Revised Code Feb. 29, 2008). 
108. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 2 cmt. Canon 2(A) (Proposed Revised 
Code Feb. 29, 2008). 
109. Id. 
110. See id. Canon 2 cmt. Canon 2(A), Canon 2.  
111. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 153 (Cambridge 
University Press 2007) (observing that “[t]he job of the judge is to render an impartial decision. 
Impartiality is the key. It explains the privileged position of judges as expositors of the law.”). 
112. See In re Hecht, 213 S.W.3d 547, 554–55 (Tex. Spec. Ct. Rev. 2006). 
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others . . . .”113 The Texas Supreme Court vacated Justice Hecht’s censure 
on the ground that Texas’ Canon 2(B) was too vague to serve as the basis 
for judicial discipline.114 As a result, there was no final determination on 
whether Justice Hecht’s conduct used the prestige of judicial office to 
advance a principally private or public interest, if any.115 
In addition to its exhortations to propriety and impartiality, and its 
prohibition on use of prestige of judicial office to further others’ private 
interests, Canon 2(B) prohibits judges from voluntarily testifying as 
character witnesses.116 Whether the Third Circuit judges testified voluntarily 
at Justice Alito’s hearing in contravention of Canon 2’s prohibition is a 
complex question.117 As a matter of official record, the Third Circuit judges 
testified in response to formal invitations to do so from the then-Chair of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee.118 However, all who testify before the Senate 
Judiciary Committee receive such letters, and so the letters may not be 
decisive of the question of actual voluntariness. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
those Third Circuit judges who testified conditioned their willingness to 
testify on receipt of formal invitations from the Committee, and Senator 
Specter emphasized this point in introducing the panelists at the hearing.119 
On this question of voluntariness, the official Commentary to Canon 
2(B) instructs judges to discourage being called to testify as character 
witnesses.120 There is no evidence of such an effort here. To the contrary, 
                                                                                                                            
113. Id. at 553; TEX. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2(B) (2007), available at 
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/Judethics/canons.asp#Canon2. 
114. In re Hecht, 213 S.W.3d at 575–76. 
115. A potentially important factor in the Canon 2 analysis, relating to both its exhortation 
to impartiality and prohibition on use of prestige of judicial office to further the judge’s or 
others’ private interests, is the Supreme Court’s ruling in Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White. 536 U.S. 765, 795–96 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing broad First 
Amendment rights for judges in the context of judicial election campaigns). In White, the 
Supreme Court framed the question for decision as “[w]hether the First Amendment permits the 
Minnesota Supreme Court to prohibit candidates for judicial election in that State from 
announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues,” and held that Minnesota’s “no 
announce” rule violated the First Amendment as a prior restraint on speech. Id. at 768, 788. 
Given the Court’s opinion in White, a prohibition on judges testifying at others’ Senate 
confirmation hearings may well be struck down absent a finding that the prohibition is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. 
116. TEX. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2(B) (2007), available at 
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/Judethics/canons.asp#Canon2. 
117. According to Rotunda, this prohibition on voluntary character testimony was not 
relevant to the judges’ Alito hearing testimony because the provision has not been applied 
outside of the criminal trial context. See Rotunda, supra note 5, at 1370 n.148. 
118. See Alito Hearing, supra note 17, at 653.   
119. Id.  
120. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 2 cmt. Canon 2(B) (Proposed Revised 
Code Feb. 29, 2008) (providing that “[e]xcept in unusual circumstances where the demands of 
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we know that Judge Becker played a central role in organizing the panel 
testimony.121 
Turning to the question of whether the judges provided character or fact 
testimony at the Alito hearing, where the prohibition is on voluntary 
character testimony, the answer is that they provided both. The judges’ 
testimony included many statements about Alito’s temperament, integrity, 
and humility that contained both factual and character elements.122 Other 
statements were simply factual in nature, as when the judges observed that 
Alito had never raised his voice in post-argument conferences and that Alito 
had refused to have a reception held in honor of his tenth anniversary on the 
bench.123 Still other statements constituted clear character, or opinion, 
testimony as when Judge Becker asserted that Alito was not a “movement 
person” and was not an “ideologue.”124 
In determining whether the judges’ testimony was primarily factual or 
character in nature, it might be useful to consider what relevant facts a judge 
might address at another judge’s elevation hearing. In Courts and Congress, 
Katzmann suggests that there might be a role for a chief district judge to 
provide his or her views when formally solicited by a congressional 
committee about whether a district judge nominated for elevation to the 
court of appeals was up-to-date with his or her docket.125 Substituting 
“circuit” for “district” in Katzmann’s hypothetical, none of the current or 
former Third Circuit judges who testified at the Alito hearing and who had 
served as chief judges while Alito was on the bench (Judges Scirica, 
Becker, and Aldisert) addressed in their Senate testimony whether Alito had 
been up-to-date with assigned opinions and other case dispositions.126 
Moreover, there is no need for judicial colleagues to testify to this type of 
factual information because the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
(“AO”) maintains official data on case dispositions.127 Rather than call a 
chief judge to provide his or her understanding of an elevation candidate’s 
                                                                                                                            
justice require, a judge should discourage a party from requiring the judge to testify as a 
character witness”). The ABA’s annotated guide to its then-parallel model judicial conduct code 
noted one of the motivations for the prohibition on voluntary character testimony as being a call 
from judges for protection from such requests. See, e.g., E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES 
TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 49 (1973). 
121. See Alito Hearing, supra note 17, at 653. 
122. Id. at 654–56 (Third Circuit Judge Becker describing Alito’s judicial temperament, 
integrity, intellect, and approach to law). 
123. Id. at 654–55. 
124. Id. at 655. 
125. KATZMANN, supra note 12, at 95–96. 
126. See Alito Hearing, supra note 17, at 654–61. 
127. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/ao/services.htm (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2008). 
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case management record, the Senate Judiciary Committee could instead 
examine AO data. Indeed, submission of a set of AO data for the period of a 
nominee’s judicial service could become standard practice for Senate 
consideration of sitting judges nominated for elevation, obviating any need 
for judges to testify about these types of factual matters at others’ 
confirmation hearings.128 
A last consideration on this question of judges volunteering character 
testimony concerns the Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of 
Conduct’s Advisory Opinion No. 9, which provides that, if judges present 
character testimony, then the number of judges testifying should be 
limited.129 Insofar as the Alito hearing testimony represented an 
unprecedented expansion in the number of judges testifying, the panel 
appeared to have tried to demonstrate strength in numbers in support of 
Alito’s confirmation, rather than limiting their presence. 
With final regard to conduct code provisions arguably counseling against 
testimony by judges at others’ confirmation hearings, Canon 7 instructs 
judges to refrain from political activity, providing, inter alia, “[a] judge 
should not . . . publicly endorse or oppose a candidate for public office” and 
“[a] judge should not engage in any other political activity.”130 Canon 5 
contains an important caveat for purposes of this article: that its prohibition 
on judicial involvement in political activity “should not prevent a judge 
from engaging in the activities described in Canon 4,”131 which authorizes 
                                                                                                                            
128. Returning to the fact versus character question, Katzmann distinguished the situation 
of a chief district judge called upon by a congressional committee or Senator to evaluate a 
sitting district court judge nominated for elevation from a non-chief judge called upon to 
provide his or her views on “the fitness of a particular judicial nominee” (analogous to the 
testimony at the Alito hearing). See KATZMANN, supra note 12, at 95. Here, Katzmann 
observed, “the situation is different in that a chief judge would have relevant views about such 
factual, objective matters as to whether the prospective nominee disposes of his or her cases in a 
timely manner.” Id. at 96. Katzmann distinguished the chief district court judge situation yet 
further by hypothesizing a “circumstance . . . in which a sitting judge initiates contact with a 
senator or congressional committee to offer views about a prospective candidate.” Id. There, 
Katzmann observed, “the considerations arguing against such input are magnified, particularly 
the risk that the judge will be perceived as attempting to influence the legislature.” Id. 
Katzmann cautioned, “The possibility of legislative backlash underscores the danger of such a 
step. Prudence would suggest that if a judge is to provide views about a nominee, then it should 
be done, if at all, at the request of legislators.” Id. 
129. Judge Testifying as a Character Witness, Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Op. 
9 (adopted Jan. 21, 1970; revised Jan. 16, 1998), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/09.html (observing, “to the extent that the trial court has 
discretion to limit character evidence generally the trial judge should consider limiting the 
number of judges appearing in such a role”). 
130. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 7(A) (Proposed Revised Code Feb. 29, 
2008). 
131. Id. Canon 5(C). 
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judges to testify before legislative and executive branch bodies on matters 
of judicial expertise, including judicial administration.132 
Because Supreme Court confirmation hearings are highly politicized, 
testimony by judges at these hearings risks injecting the judges into political 
activity and casting the judiciary in an overtly political role. This in turn 
risks undermining public trust and confidence in the courts and respect for 
the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judicial process.133 
D. Conclusions as to the Testimony’s Permissibility Under the Judicial 
Conduct Code 
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the Code of Conduct for U.S. 
Judges does not directly address the permissibility of sitting judges 
testifying at others’ judicial confirmation hearings. While Canon 4’s 
authorization of judicial testimony on matters of judicial expertise and 
Canon 2(B)’s Commentary’s authorization of judges’ responses to official 
inquiries concerning individual judicial candidates arguably support such 
testimony, consideration of the larger principles animating the judicial 
conduct code––impartiality,134 independence, and non-involvement in 
political activity––appear to counsel against it. 
E. Must Judicial Elevation Candidates, Such as Alito, Recuse Themselves, 
if Confirmed, from Reviewing Cases Participated in by Their Testifying 
and/or Non-testifying Colleagues? 
A Supreme Court candidate’s need to recuse him or herself from 
considering cases in which his or her testifying (and/or non-testifying) 
colleagues participated below is not the, or even a, central question in 
evaluating the wisdom and propriety of judges testifying at others’ judicial 
                                                                                                                            
132. Id. Canon 5(B). 
133. As Morrison observed in his essay on judges and politics:  
[I]t is hard to imagine a more political activity than the confirmation of a 
Supreme Court justice. There is no pretense that competence, integrity, and 
judicial temperament are all that matter, nor is there any doubt that presidents 
do take political considerations into account and that the Senate does also. 
This fact alone should be enough to preclude federal judges from testifying at 
confirmation hearings . . . . 
Morrison, supra note 5, at 297. 
134. W. Bradley Wendel, Abstract, Jurisprudence and Judicial Ethics (Cornell Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 08-009, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1024316 (observing that “[t]he fundamental 
value in judicial ethics is impartiality”). 
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confirmation hearings. Indeed, it is a bit of a red herring, given the more 
pressing questions for judicial independence and judicial ethics effects 
raised by the testimony. Nevertheless, the question of recusal need is 
addressed briefly here because it was raised by Senators, academics, and 
other commentators at the time of the Alito hearing.135 More specific 
questions include whether recusal is triggered only by testimony offered in 
favor of confirmation? Against confirmation?136 Only by the case 
participation of testifying judges? Non-testifying judges? 
As it happened, Justice Alito recused himself from considering what 
appears to be all Third Circuit cases coming before the Supreme Court for 
review (at both the petition for certiorari and merits stages) for more than 
one year following his confirmation to the Court, though he did not state his 
reason(s) for recusal.137 It may well be that Justice Alito recused himself 
from consideration of his former court’s matters as a result of the Third 
Circuit’s practice of circulating and pre-filing all published opinions to all 
active judges for review.138 Because every active Third Circuit judge 
                                                                                                                            
135. See Alito Hearing, supra note 17, at 644–52; see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., RECUSAL: 
ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 & 144, at 1 (2002), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/Recusal.pdf/$file/Recusal.pdf. For excellent 
treatments of judicial recusal standards, see generally Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: 
A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531 (2005) and Arthur 
D. Hellman, The Regulation of Judicial Ethics in the Federal System: A Peek Behind Closed 
Doors, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 189 (2007). 
136. Chief Justice Rehnquist recused himself for several years from considering cases 
involving James Brosnahan of Morrison & Foerster, who had testified against Rehnquist at his 
elevation hearing. See Mauro, supra note 57, at 13. 
137. I found 162 instances in which Justice Alito had taken “no part in the consideration or 
decision” of a case from the Third Circuit, including petitions for certiorari, petitions for 
rehearing from denial of certiorari, and decisions on the merits (LEXIS search last performed on 
Mar. 7, 2008). The Third Circuit cases from which Justice Alito has recused himself in the 
Supreme Court included some in which he had served on the appellate panel, such as Beard v. 
Banks, in which then-Judge Alito had authored a dissent. 548 U.S. 521, 524 (2006). Most of the 
Third Circuit cases from which Justice Alito recused himself did not involve his participation at 
the appellate level. See, e.g., Wadley v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1894 (2007) (denying petition 
for certiorari with respect to unpublished opinion authored by Judge Smith and joined by Judges 
Barry and Rodriguez). 
While some of the Third Circuit cases from which Justice Alito has recused himself 
involved one or more of his testifying colleagues, see, e.g., id. (considering unpublished opinion 
authored by Judge Smith and joined by Judges Barry and Rodriguez), the majority of the Third 
Circuit cases from which Justice Alito has recused himself did not involve his testifying 
colleagues. See, e.g., Vazquez v. Ragonese, 127 S. Ct. 1213 (2007) (denying petition for 
certiorari with respect to unpublished opinion by Judge Rendell and joined by Judges Fisher and 
Van Antwerpen). 
      138. See 3D CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING P. § 5.5.4 (2002), available at 
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf. 
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reviews every published opinion pre-filing,139 every active judge may be 
considered to have participated in the decision. That then would serve as a 
basis for recusal, as detailed in the discussion below.140 
The two most recently confirmed justices prior to Alito, Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justice Breyer, had also recused themselves from consideration 
of cases, at both the certiorari and merits stages, arising from their former 
courts of appeals (the District of Columbia and First circuits, 
respectively).141 This is so even though none of their colleagues had testified 
at their confirmation hearings.142 What is not known is whether their 
recusals were prompted by parallel opinion-circulation practices in their 
circuits, or whether their recusals suggest a Supreme Court custom, though 
not rule, against involvement in a case that was on one’s lower court’s 
docket while serving as a lower court judge. 
Looking to the federal law governing judicial recusal,143 a judge’s need 
to recuse him or herself from consideration of a case arises either from (a) 
concern for the appearance or actuality of partiality,144 or from (b) specific 
grounds including personal knowledge of the facts of a case, or familial or 
financial involvement in the case.145 More specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) 
provides that a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which 
his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”146 Section 455 was 
amended years ago to substitute an objective test for the previously 
subjective test, where the question for decision now is whether a judge’s 
participation would be apparently improper because apparently partial.147 A 
                                                                                                                            
139. See id. 
140. I found a number of instances in which Chief Justice Roberts had taken “no part in the 
consideration or decision” of a case from the D.C. Circuit, including decisions on petitions for 
certiorari, on petitions for rehearing from denial of certiorari, and on the merits (LEXIS search 
last performed on Mar. 7, 2008). Looking to the last Justice confirmed before Chief Justice 
Roberts, Justice Breyer recused himself from consideration of First Circuit cases at both the 
certiorari and merits stages. See, e.g., United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 516 U.S. 
1140 (1996). 
141. See, e.g., id. (Breyer recusing himself from ruling on petition of certiorari from First 
Circuit). 
142. See infra app. A. 
143. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2001). Section 455 applies to Supreme Court Justices and lower 
court judges. Id. § 455(a). See generally Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations 
of the Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1887–90 (1988) (discussing 
interpretation and application of judicial recusal standards). 
144. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). 
145. Id. § 455(b). 
146. Id. § 455(a). 
147. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, The Threat to Judicial Independence by Criticism of 
Judges––A Proposed Solution to the Real Problem, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 729, 740–41 (1997). 
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Supreme Court Justice’s need to recuse is left for decision to the individual 
Justice and is not reviewed by his or her colleagues.148 
Justice Alito’s decision to recuse himself from considering all Third 
Circuit matters coming before the Court was not unreasonable, where his 
impartiality “might reasonably be questioned”149 with regard to published 
decisions he had reviewed pre-filing as a result of the Third Circuit’s 
opinion-circulation practice, or with regard to cases in which his lower 
court colleagues had participated, whether testifiers or non-testifiers. On 
this latter point, Steven Lubet incorrectly distinguished at the time of the 
Alito hearing between “[a] justice’s anger at someone who testifies against 
him” and “a judge’s gratitude toward someone who testifies for him,”150 
where either circumstance could give rise to reasonable questions of 
partiality. 
I conclude then where I began: that recusal is not the main issue, nor 
even one of the more important issues, arising when federal judges testify at 
others’ judicial confirmation hearings. I turn instead to recommendations 
for the future. Specifically, are there other more desirable mechanisms for 
judges to share with appointing officials their impressions of colleagues 
who are candidates for elevation? 
                                                                                                                            
148. See Hellman, supra note 135, at 203 n.87 (quoting Justice Rehnquist in Hanrahan v. 
Hampton, 446 U.S. 1301 (1980), noting, “generally the Court as an institution leaves 
[disqualification] motions, even though they be addressed to it, to the decision of the individual 
Justices to whom they refer”). 
 A particular concern with recusal at the Supreme Court level, highlighted by Justice Alito’s 
written response to Senator Feingold’s recusal inquiry at the hearing, is that it results in an eight-
person court, with the possibility of a four-four tie, leading to affirmance of the lower court 
judgment. Alito Hearing, supra note 17, at 791. Alito’s written response observed, inter alia: 
Supreme Court Justices have less latitude to err on the side of recusal, 
because recusal can lead to decisions that are evenly divided or that involve 
less than an absolute majority of the Court. Lack of a definitive resolution to 
a case when the litigants have no higher court that could resolve their cases 
undermines the judicial process. 
Id. Justice Alito concluded by noting: 
Based on what I know at this time, I do not think that the testimony of the 
court of appeals judges should require me to recuse myself in cases on which 
they sat, but if confirmed, I would undertake a thorough review of the past 
practices of Justices in any analogous situations, and if a recusal motion is 
filed in a case on which one or more of the testifying judges sat, I would 
carefully consider the arguments presented. 
Id. 
149. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). 
150. Mauro, supra note 57, at 13 (quoting Lubet as observing that “[a] justice’s anger at 
someone who testifies against him is more palpable than a judge’s gratitude toward someone 
who testifies for him. They are not symmetrical.”). 
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VI. ARE THERE OTHER MORE DESIRABLE MECHANISMS FOR JUDGES TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THE ARTICLE III APPOINTMENTS PROCESS? 
I return to one of the central findings of my interviews—that most of the 
judges with whom I spoke thought judges could provide appointment 
officials with unique insights into judicial colleagues’ temperaments and 
character.151 With this in mind, I wanted to explore whether there are other 
ways besides live testimony for judges to share their impressions of, and 
experiences with, judicial colleagues who are being considered for 
elevation, and to reflect on whether these other mechanisms avoid the 
judicial independence and ethics concerns presented by live testimony. I 
look first to the two current (and historic) mechanisms of judicial 
involvement noted in the Introduction—behind-the-scenes consultations 
with Senators and participation in confidential ABA interviews.152 I then 
turn to other suggested mechanisms of judicial involvement153 and to 
comparative perspectives on judges’ roles in judicial appointments 
processes for state, federal, national, and international courts.154 
A. Judges’ Historic Involvement in Article III Appointments Processes 
Through Means Other than Presenting Live Testimony 
Henry Abraham and other scholars have documented the active role 
played by some judges, including Supreme Court Justices, in suggesting 
names of prospective judicial candidates to appointment officials, including 
the President, and lobbying for particular candidates since at least the early 
part of the twentieth century.155 Chief Justice Warren Burger, for example, 
was notoriously active in lobbying the President and other appointing 
officials for Supreme Court and circuit court candidates, as were Chief 
Justice William Howard Taft and Justice Abe Fortas.156  
                                                                                                                            
151. See infra app. B. 
152. See supra Part I; infra Part VI.A. 
153. See infra Part VI.B. 
154. See infra Part VI.C. 
155. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. 
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 25 (Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, 5th ed. 2008) (1974). 
156. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS 21–22 (Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 4th ed. 1999) (1974); see DAVID J. DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 
IS APPOINTED 54–55 (Random House 1964) (1963) (recounting Justice Taft’s lobbying for 
Justice Pierce Butler’s appointment); GERHARDT, supra note 56, at 194–95 (highlighting Justice 
Frankfurter’s lobbying of President Roosevelt for Judge Learned Hand’s Supreme Court 
appointment); DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 87–88 (W. W. Norton & Company 2005) (1986); see also DAVID A. YALOF, PURSUIT 
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This behind-the-scenes consultation between judges and executive and 
legislative branch appointments officials continues into the present, initiated 
in some instances by judges and in others by other branch officials.157 These 
consultations raise many of the same concerns as live testimony for judicial 
independence effects (both institutional and individual), integrity, 
impartiality, use of prestige of judicial office to promote others’ private 
interests, and judicial involvement in political activity. Beyond that, behind-
the-scenes consultations lack transparency and are “virtually impossible to 
monitor and control.”158 As Gerhardt has observed, “informal consultation 
could represent the opposite of the democratization of the process by 
reflecting the degree to which decision makers are captive to or consult only 
with a relatively small elite.”159 Gerhardt goes so far as to consider whether 
there should be a law prohibiting legislative or executive branch 
consultation by judges on judicial appointments, but concludes that such a 
law “would be difficult to enforce,” noting “[f]ederal judges might find 
ways around it by sending signals by indirect, difficult-to-detect means.”160 
As for the second means of ongoing judicial involvement in the judicial 
appointments process—participation in confidential interviews with ABA 
representatives investigating judicial candidates, the ABA has spoken with 
judges (as well as lawyers, litigants, and others) about the merits of actual 
and prospective judicial nominees since 1956.161 Established early in the 
Eisenhower administration, the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal 
Judiciary played a central role in the investigation and evaluation of federal 
judicial candidates through the end of the Clinton presidency.162 President 
George W. Bush ended the practice of forwarding names of prospective 
nominees to the ABA Standing Committee pre-nomination soon after he 
entered office,163 and the ABA currently initiates its investigation after 
public announcement of a nomination. Relevant information gleaned from 
the ABA’s confidential interviews is reported to the Senate on an 
anonymous basis.164 The confidentiality and anonymity of the ABA 
                                                                                                                            
OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 11–12, 
123, 138 (1999). 
157. ABRAHAM, supra note 155, at 18–19. 
158. GERHARDT, supra note 56, at 231–32.  
159. Id. at 232. 
160. Id. at 233. 
161. See O’BRIEN,  supra note 3, at 84–85. 
162. See id. at 85; GERHARDT, supra note 56, at 141. 
163. LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENTS 74 (2005). 
164. ABA STANDING COMM., supra note 47, at 3. 
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investigatory process is thought to encourage judges and others to be more 
candid in their assessments of nominees.165 
In the case of Alito’s nomination to be Associate Justice,  
the Standing Committee . . . interviewed more than 300 people 
from all Federal circuits who knew, had worked with, or had 
substantial knowledge of the nominee. Of that number over 130 
were Federal judges, including all members of the Supreme Court 
of the United States [and] members of the United States Courts of 
Appeals . . . .”166  
As this example makes clear, ABA interviews with judges constitute a 
significant form of judicial involvement in the Article III appointments 
process. 
The ABA’s evaluation process has not been without its critics. Concerns 
have been raised, for example, for the potential for bias and/or mistaken 
understandings affecting confidential interview statements. Because 
interview comments are reported anonymously, if at all, candidates and 
appointment officials are handicapped in their ability to respond to negative 
comments. As a result, the ABA interviews also raise transparency 
concerns. It was with these concerns in mind that Michael Dorf questioned, 
“[i]f that information can enter the process indirectly, what’s wrong with 
airing it directly?”167 In other words, “What’s the big deal with the live 
testimony?” 
Indeed, judges’ live confirmation hearing testimonies contain at least two 
elements that offer the promise of greater transparency of judicial input and 
protection against unchecked communication of bias and/or misinformation 
than do either of the longstanding mechanisms of judicial involvement. 
First, the open format of the live testimony appears to provide some 
measure of accountability for judge-witnesses’ statements. A conundrum 
arises, however, in that the very public nature of the sitting judges’ 
testimony is a significant part of what is most concerning about the 
testimony from a judicial independence and ethics perspective. The 
testimony’s very openness raises concerns for negative impacts on public 
trust and confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the courts. The 
public nature of the testimony likewise raises concerns for the use of 
                                                                                                                            
165. Id. The ABA then rates each nominee as “well qualified,” “qualified,” or “not 
qualified” in a report submitted both orally and in writing to the Senate Judiciary Committee. Id. 
at 8–9. 
166. Letter from Stephen L. Tober, Chair, ABA Standing Comm. on Fed. Judiciary, to the 
Honorable Arlen Specter, Chair, S. Comm. on the Judiciary 3 (Jan. 9, 2006), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/SCpage/Alito-letter.pdf. 
167. Dorf, supra note 4. 
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prestige of judicial office to promote others’ private interests and for 
judges’ involvement in overt political activity. The answer to this 
conundrum should not, of course, be to hide this type of judicial influence, 
but, rather, to engage in an open examination of its desirability. 
Second, live questioning of judge-witnesses by Senate committee 
members offers at least the promise of direct follow-up, whether the 
testimony is negative or positive in nature. That said, I question whether the 
judges’ hearing testimony offers a truly meaningful opportunity for follow-
up. Despite the judges’ emphasis on live Senate questioning as one of the 
testimony’s central benefits akin to cross-examination at trial, a number of 
those with whom I spoke made clear that as soon as Senate questioning 
becomes probing, judge-witnesses would, and likely should, resist 
answering on the grounds of confidentiality of the judicial process or from 
concern for other judicial independence harms. Thus, if a Committee 
member were to question a judge-witness about something that transpired at 
a post-argument conference, or having to do with the substance of a judge’s 
vote on a particular case, or on how two or more judges came to agree on a 
particular passage or holding in an opinion, the judge-witness would, and 
likely should, invoke confidentiality and/or respect for institutional comity 
and refuse to answer. This dynamic already exists with respect to nominees’ 
testimony, and it is this “prevarication” and “non-responsiveness” that have 
prompted Benjamin Wittes, and others, to call for an end to nominee 
testimony.168 The same dynamic exists for confirmation hearing testimony 
by a nominee’s judicial colleague. 
Given concerns for the lack of transparency of the two historic means of 
judicial involvement in judicial appointments and for the various concerns 
raised by judges’ live testimony, I turn to suggestions of other possible 
means of participation by judges in Article III appointments. 
B. Other Means of Involvement by Judges in Judicial Appointments? 
Are there other mechanisms for involving judges in Article III 
appointments that avoid the concerns identified with existing processes? 
One judge with whom I spoke proposed several ways of trying to preserve 
some of the value of live testimony while avoiding some of the testimony’s 
potential impacts on judicial independence and judicial ethics. First, he 
suggested having the nominee’s colleagues testify in the Senate 
confirmation hearing’s closed session, instituted after Clarence Thomas’ 
confirmation hearing as a forum for airing sensitive matters related to ethics 
                                                                                                                            
168. WITTES, supra note 1, at 118–28. 
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and personal finances.169 Alternatively, he proposed taking oral testimony 
from the nominee’s immediate judicial colleagues and reporting it to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee without attribution, noting that this might 
better preserve the dignity of the judiciary by avoiding the appearance of 
partiality and/or political involvement potentially at stake in the Alito 
hearing. This judge acknowledged that such an approach would sacrifice the 
live testimony’s directness of exchange between judge-witnesses and 
Senate committee members, thought by many of the judges with whom I 
spoke to be one of the principal benefits of the judges’ testimony. Third, he 
suggested having the ABA Standing Committee representatives field 
questions from the Senate Judiciary Committee on the substance of their 
interviews with the nominee’s judicial colleagues when they present their 
report to the Committee in open session. None of these proposals works, 
however, where the third raises hearsay-like concerns and may well impact 
the candor with which the ABA interviews are conducted, while the first 
and second fail to address concerns for the transparency of the testimony. 
Another alternative suggested to me was to establish a standing body of 
judges within the federal judiciary to conduct investigations of other judges 
nominated for elevation, with findings reported to judicial appointments 
officials in the executive and legislative branches. This proposal is akin to, 
though different from, the operation of judicial appointments commissions 
in other systems and presents many of the same judicial independence and 
ethics concerns raised by the live testimony, including potential for 
partiality and political involvement by judges.170 Yet another alternative 
suggested to me was to allow only former federal judges to testify at 
judicial elevation hearings. While this proposal avoids judicial conduct code 
concerns insofar as the Code does not apply to former judges, testimony by 
former judges still has the potential to shape public perceptions of judges’ 
partiality, political involvement, and use of judicial office to benefit others. 
Moreover, as with testimony by sitting judges, former judges’ testimony 
risks rendering unduly vulnerable to Senate and public scrutiny the 
necessarily confidential realm of judicial decision making. 
In rejecting various alternative proposals for judicial involvement in 
Article III appointments, I am mindful that judges are actively involved in 
the selection of judges in other judicial systems, at the state, federal, 
national, and international levels. What follows are highlights of judges’ 
                                                                                                                            
169. The idea for a closed door session at judicial confirmation hearings was originally 
published by Lloyd N. Cutler in Why Not Executive Sessions?, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1991, at 
A23. A closed session is presently held for all Supreme Court nominees. 
170. See infra Part VI.D. 
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roles in a sampling of other appointments systems, developed more fully in 
a separate article.171 
C. Comparative Perspectives on Judges’ Roles in Other Judicial 
Appointments Systems 
Participation in and/or leadership by judges is a common element of 
judicial appointments systems at the state, national, and international levels, 
and is likewise relied on for non-Article III federal appointment of 
magistrate and bankruptcy judges. Looking first to state court systems 
within the United States, approximately twenty, or two-fifths, of the states 
include judges on judicial nominating commissions, with more than half of 
these states naming the chief justice of their supreme court as chair or 
member of the state’s nominating commission.172 In most of these states, the 
nominating commissions forward names of three to five prospective judicial 
candidates to the governor for appointment.173 
Turning to non-Article III federal judicial appointments, Congress has 
provided for district court judges to appoint U.S. magistrate judges174 and 
circuit judges to select U.S. bankruptcy judges.175 Per statutory provision, 
district courts are to use merit selection panels in vetting candidates for 
magistrate judgeships, with final appointment decisions resting with the 
district judges in each district.176 Bankruptcy judges are selected by the 
circuit judges of the regional courts of appeal, and there is no statutory 
requirement of use of merit selection panels to identify qualified 
candidates.177 Magistrate and bankruptcy judges serve for fixed, renewable 
terms (of eight and fourteen years, respectively) and are reviewed by district 
                                                                                                                            
171. Clark, supra note 1. 
172. LARRY C. BERKSON & RACHEL CAUFILED, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT FOR THE AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY 2–3 (2004), available at 
http://www.ajs.org /selection/docs/Berkson.pdf.  
173. Id. Judges appointed through this system typically serve for an initial two-year term 
before facing a public retention election. 
174. Resnik, supra note 1, at 605–06 (noting that “through enactments in 1968 and in 1984, 
Congress created these new categories of what I term statutory judges and stipulated their 
method of selection and their terms of office. Article III judges at the trial level, district by 
district, appoint magistrate judges who serve for eight-year renewable terms. The number of 
magistrate slots is decided by the Judicial Conference of the United States . . . as long as it can 
allocate funds to pay for their judgeships.”) 
175. Id. at 606 (observing that “[t]he twelve appellate courts that govern geographically-
delineated circuits have the power to appoint bankruptcy judges, who serve for fourteen-year 
renewable terms. Congress has retained its power to decide directly the number of such 
judgeships . . . .”). 
176. Id. at 607. 
177. Id. 
 
 
 
 
 
1230 ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL [Ariz. St. L.J. 
and appellate court judges for purposes of reappointment. In light of these 
selection and reappointment processes, and given district and circuit court 
judges’ power to review judgments of magistrate and bankruptcy judges, 
respectively, commentators have raised concern for the meaningful 
decisional independence of magistrate and bankruptcy judges.178 
As for other countries’ judicial appointments processes, a not 
insignificant number rely exclusively or in large part on judges to select 
other judges.179 Great Britain, for example, recently revised its high court 
appointment process to locate authority to recommend justices for its new 
Supreme Court in a five-person commission chaired by the President of the 
Supreme Court (its chief justice).180 Other members of the commission 
include the Deputy President of the Supreme Court (its most senior 
associate justice) and one member each from the Judicial Appointments 
Commission for England and Wales, the Judicial Appointments Board for 
Scotland, and the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission.181 
Lower court judges in England and Wales are recommended by a different 
judicial appointments commission, which includes judges as well as 
lawyers and laypersons.182 
                                                                                                                            
178. See id. at 607–10. 
179. For an excellent recent source on other countries’ judicial appointment systems, see 
ALAN PATERSON ET AL., APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD (Kate Malleson and Peter Russell eds., 2006). For 
other outstanding sources, see generally CARLO GUARNIERI & PATRIZIA PEDERZOLI, THE POWER 
OF JUDGES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COURTS AND DEMOCRACY (C.A. Thomas ed., 2002) and 
John Bell, Judicial Appointments: Some European Experiences (Oct. 4, 2003) (unpublished 
paper from the Conference on “Judicial Reform: Function, Appointment and Structure” held by 
the Centre for Public Law, University of Cambridge), available at 
http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/docs/view.php?doc=865. 
180. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ACT, 2005, app. 1, pt. 3, § 21 (Eng.), at 10, available at 
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.com/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldconst/83/83.pdf 
[hereinafter CRA]. Pursuant to the CRA, the final appellate review authority exercised by the 
Appellate Committee of the Law Lords of the House of Lords is to be transferred to a newly 
established Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, to be composed of the former Law Lords, 
known as “Justices.” Id. app. 1, pt. 3, § 20, at 9–10. The Supreme Court will begin operating in 
October 2009. Id. app. 1, Commencement, at 7. 
181. Id. app. 1, pt. 3, § 21, at 10. Note that the last three listed individuals on the Supreme 
Court appointments commission (from the new regional judicial appointments commissions) 
may or may not be judges. Id. The CRA and related consultation papers specify that the 
Commission must consult with judges familiar with the selectee’s work as a lower court judge 
and that when the Lord Chancellor receives the commission’s report, he must consult with all 
judges consulted by the commission itself along with other senior judges of the British courts 
and other officials of Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. 
182. See id. app. 1, pt. 4, § 31, at 12; see also Kate Malleson, The New Judicial 
Appointments Commission in England and Wales: New Wine in New Bottles?, in APPOINTING 
JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 179, at 48–49. 
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In Israel, a nine-member judicial selection committee composed of 
professional and political representatives names judges to the general 
courts, peace courts, and Supreme Court.183 The five professional members 
of the commission include three Supreme Court justices and two members 
of the bar.184 
In strictly civil law systems,185 judges play an even more central role in 
judicial selection. In France, for example, judicial candidates are recruited 
directly out of the National Judges College.186 The Supreme Judicial 
Council (Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature, “CSM”), composed of 
judges, prosecutors, and laypersons, proposes candidates for the “ordinary 
judiciary,” including the Supreme Court of Appeals (Cour de Cassation) 
and the principal trial and appellate courts.187 The President of the Republic 
formally appoints candidates recommended by the CSM.188 The CSM must 
also give periodic “advice,” or evaluations, of lower court judges.189 
A survey of selection methods for international court judges reveals a 
wide variety of approaches used,190 including some reliance on judges to 
propose judicial candidates. The ICJ, for example, recommends that 
member states confer with their high court justices, among other officials, in 
nominating candidates for election by participating states.191 Most 
international courts are silent on how states-members should nominate 
judicial candidates. In response to concern for lack of guidance on judicial 
nomination procedures, a report on the judicial appointments process for the 
                                                                                                                            
183. Judges Law, 5713–1953, LSI 124 (Isr.). 
184. Eli M. Salzberger, Judicial Appointments and Promotions in Israel: Constitution, Law, 
and Politics, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 179, at 248–49.  
185. Reference to “strictly” civil law systems is intended to distinguish the Israeli legal 
system from the civil law systems in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere, where Israeli law 
reflects a hybrid of common law and civil law traditions.  The latter is seen most prominently in 
Israel’s codification of contract and tort law. 
186. See Bell, supra note 179, at 7–8; see also Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature, 
Recrutement sur concours (2007), available at http://www.enm.justice.fr//devenir-
magistrat/recrutement-concours.php. 
187. See Bell, supra note 179, at 7–8; see also Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature, 
Recrutement hors concours, available at http://www.enm.justice.fr//devenir-magistrat/sans-
concours.php. 
188. See Bell, supra note 179, at 7–8; see also Ecole Nationale de la Magistrature, Devenir 
Magistrat (2007), available at http://www.enm.justice.fr//devenir-magistrat/accueil.php. 
189. See Bell, supra note 179, at 7–8. 
190. The discussion here includes, but is not limited to, the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
191. Ruth MacKenzie & Phillipe Sands, Judicial Selection for International Courts: 
Towards Common Principles and Practices, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL 
POWER, supra note 179, at 220. 
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ECHR recommended, inter alia, “the establishment of independent bodies 
at the national level to nominate candidates . . . .”192 The ECHR also 
recently amended its rules to provide for a longer non-renewable term of 
judicial service to minimize incentives for judges to decide cases so as to 
promote their re-election prospects.193 
Lastly, of particular relevance to this article’s focus on judges’ testimony 
at other judicial candidates’ confirmation hearings, none of the systems 
highlighted here involve legislative branch confirmation hearings. As a 
result, the particular concerns involved in judges testifying at others’ 
hearings are not presented. 
D. Some Reflections on Merits of Judges’ Roles in Other Judicial 
Appointment Systems 
Reflecting on the comparative merits of sitting judges’ roles in other 
judicial appointments systems and focusing specifically on the relatively 
common practice of judges serving on, even chairing, judicial nominating 
commissions, some of the advantages of that practice include: judges know 
what the “job” of judging entails and can effectively evaluate judicial 
candidates from that vantage point; judges on the commission may have 
first-person experience of the nominee’s judicial temperament, character, 
and work ethic from working together in practice and/or on the bench; 
participation by judges gives the judiciary greater control over its own 
“staffing;” and successful judges can “reproduce” themselves by recruiting 
similarly skilled colleagues for the bench. There are also some compelling 
disadvantages, including: judicial involvement in judicial selection is less 
democratic, or democracy-reinforcing, than participation by members of the 
public and publicly accountable elected officials; judges can dominate the 
opinions and/or votes of non-judges on judicial nominating commissions, 
thereby undermining the diversity of views expressed, considered one of the 
central benefits of the nominating commission model; judges do not 
necessarily know what is most desirable in a judicial candidate because the 
public, and not fellow judges, are the consumers of judges’ work and have 
valuable ideas about what makes a good judge; lower court judges could be 
motivated to curry favor for promotion with judges known or anticipated to 
be on the judicial nominating commission, with potential effects on judicial 
reasoning and outcomes; judges picking other judges presents the potential 
for “stacking the deck” ideologically; potential for public perception of the 
                                                                                                                            
192. Id. at 229. 
193. See id. at 223. 
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partiality and/or political involvement by judges; and actual potential for 
judges’ injection into partisan politics. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Mindful of other approaches to the question of judicial participation in 
other judicial appointments systems and of their comparative advantages 
and disadvantages, this article nevertheless concludes that federal judges 
should not testify at others’ Article III confirmation hearings. The U.S. 
Constitution reserves the power to nominate and confirm judges to the 
executive and legislative branches. No official role or power is granted to 
the judiciary regarding judicial appointments, and none shall be assumed. 
Judges threaten judicial independence and judicial ethics principles when 
they exercise power in the Article III appointments realm. It is not so much 
a question of judges usurping the Senate’s domain when they testify, 
especially where the Senate has invited their testimony, but, rather, a 
question of judges inappropriately assisting the Senate in its constitutional 
advise and consent function. Concern for inappropriate judicial role, along 
with concern for actual and perceived partiality, overt political involvement, 
and use of prestige of office by judges to benefit others, counsel against 
judges testifying at others’ judicial confirmation hearings, where, on 
balance, the testimony presents more concerns than benefits for the well-
being of individual judges, the judiciary, and the three branch system.  
Greater thought should instead be given to whether members of the bar, 
other professional colleagues, members of civic organizations, and other 
non-judges can present useful testimony on the nominee’s judicial 
temperament and qualifications for office and thereby avoid the judicial 
independence and judicial ethics concerns associated with judges’ 
participation in the Article III appointments process.194 The Senate could 
learn much, for example, about a nominee’s possession of the attributes 
Abraham argues Supreme Court justices should hold, including 
“demonstrated judicial temperament” and “professional expertise and 
competence,” by hearing from lawyers and litigants who have appeared 
before the nominee, as well as bar association representatives, other civic 
leaders, and legal academics familiar with the nominee.195 With so many 
                                                                                                                            
194. Here, I echo KATZMANN, supra note 12, at 95–96.  
195. ABRAHAM, supra note 155, at 2. These attributes are: “One, demonstrated judicial 
temperament. Two, professional expertise and competence. Three, absolute personal as well as 
professional integrity. Four, an able, agile, lucid mind. Five, appropriate professional 
educational background or training. Six, the ability to communicate clearly, both orally and in 
writing, especially the latter.” Id. (citation omitted). 
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non-judges available to testify, and with their testimony avoiding concerns 
for judicial independence and judicial ethics effects, the Senate should 
desist from calling sitting judges to testify at others’ Article III confirmation 
hearings, and judges should resist any such calls. 
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APPENDIX A 
History of Federal Judges’ Testimony at Others’ Supreme Court 
Confirmation Hearings√ 
A complete listing of testimony by current and former federal judges at 
others’ Supreme Court confirmation hearings is as follows: 
 
Clement Haynsworth to be Associate Justice (1969) 
 
Testimony by: 
 
Judge Harrison Winter of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit;  
 
and Former Judge Lawrence Walsh of the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, and then-current Chair, ABA Standing 
Committee on the Federal Judiciary.‡ 
 
William Rehnquist to be Associate Justice (1971) 
 
Testimony by Judge Walter Craig of the U.S. District Court for Arizona 
in support.  
 
William Rehnquist to be Chief Justice (1986) 
 
Testimony by former Judge Griffin Bell of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit, and former Attorney General, in support.∗ 
 
                                                                                                                            
√ In addition to presenting live testimony, current and former judges have also submitted 
letters and written statements to the Senate Judiciary Committee in support of individual 
Supreme Court nominees. See, e.g., Letter from the Hon. Tom Clark, former U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice, to the Senate Judiciary Committee (Apr. 20, 1970); Nomination of Harry A. 
Blackmun of Minn. to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 28 (Apr. 29, 1970) (supporting the 
confirmation of Judge Harry Blackmun to be Associate Justice). 
∗ As the above list reveals, Griffin Bell has testified in support of the nominee at four 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings. Bell’s status as a former Attorney General who oversaw 
judicial appointments in the Carter administration (along with the White House Counsel) was of 
greater relevance to his appearance at these hearings than his status as a former federal judge. 
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Robert Bork to be Associate Justice (1987)  
 
Testimony by: 
 
Retired Chief Justice Warren Burger of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
support; 
 
Former Judge Griffin Bell of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, and former Attorney General, in support; 
 
Former Judge Shirley M. Hufstedler of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, and former Secretary of Education, in opposition;  
 
and former Judge Harold Tyler of the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, and then-current Chair, ABA Standing 
Committee on the Federal Judiciary.‡ 
 
Anthony Kennedy to be Associate Justice (1987) 
 
Former Judge Harold Tyler of the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, and then-current Chair, ABA Standing Committee on 
the Federal Judiciary.‡ 
 
David Souter to be Associate Justice (1990) 
 
Testimony by former Judge Griffin Bell of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit, and former Attorney General, in support. 
 
Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice (1991) 
 
Testimony by:  
 
Former Judge Griffin Bell of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, and former Attorney General, in support; 
 
Former Judge John Gibbons of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit in support; and 
                                                                                                                            
‡  Note that former Judge Lawrence Walsh and former Judge Harold Tyler each 
testified specifically as the then-current Chair of the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal 
Judiciary, and not in their capacities as former federal judges. 
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Judge Jack Tanner of the U.S. District Court for Washington in support. 
 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be Associate Justice (1993) 
 
Former Judge Shirley M. Hufstedler of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, and former Secretary of Education, in support. 
 
John Roberts to be Chief Justice (2005) 
 
Testimony by former Judge Nathaniel Jones of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, raising concerns about the nominee’s civil 
rights record.+ 
 
Samuel Alito to be Associate Justice (2006)  
 
Testimony by seven current and former judges of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit in support. 
                                                                                                                            
+ Judge Jones’s testimony is identified here as “raising concerns about” Roberts’s 
candidacy, rather than “opposing” it because nowhere in Judge Jones’s testimony did he directly 
state his opposition to Roberts’s confirmation. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on 
Nomination of John Roberts to be Chief Justice, S. Hrg. 109-158, at 466–67 (2005). Judge Jones 
introduced his testimony by stating that he was speaking on behalf of a number of civil rights 
“greats” to raise concerns about Roberts’s civil rights record. Id. 
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APPENDIX B 
Interview Methodology 
I mailed three rounds of letters to active and senior Third Circuit judges 
serving at the time of the Alito hearing, asking the judges to contact me if 
they were interested in speaking about the question of judges testifying at 
others’ confirmation hearings. I contacted nineteen judges in total. Judge 
Becker died in May 2006 as I began work on this project, and so I did not 
have an opportunity to speak with him about the testimony.  
The first round of letters was sent to all judges on July 5, 2006. The 
second round of letters was sent to those I had not yet heard from on August 
15, 2006. The third, and final, round of letters was sent to those I still had 
not heard from as of September 25, 2006. I also wrote to the two former 
judges who had testified at Justice Alito’s hearing with the same request 
noted above. 
I received responses from fourteen judges. Ten granted interviews, on 
which I took contemporaneous notes from which I draw their interview 
comments here. The judges with whom I spoke have reviewed this article in 
draft form to confirm the accuracy of the interview comments attributed to 
them. These judges included slightly more non-testifying than testifying 
judges and more judges who supported the practice than were critical of it. 
The four who declined to be interviewed did not state a reason for their 
declining and included both those who had testified and those who had not. 
I interviewed eight of the judges by telephone and two in person. All of 
the interviews were conducted between July and October, 2006. The 
interviews were relatively brief, typically running 25 to 35 minutes, with the 
two in-person interviews lasting longer than that. 
As noted earlier, where most, but not all, of the judges with whom I 
spoke made their comments for attribution, I do not identify any of them by 
name so as not to reveal the identities of those who did not speak for 
attribution. Moreover, I refer to all of my interview subjects as “judge” so 
as not to identify whether a current or former judge made the particular 
comment and as “he” so as not to identify the judge’s sex. I do note whether 
the judges whose comments I highlight had testified or not, where that 
factor may well be important in evaluating their comments. 
At the same time that I contacted the judges, I also mailed letters seeking 
interviews to Senators Arlen Specter and Patrick Leahy as then-Chair and 
ranking minority member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. I received 
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several responses from Senator Specter’s office indicating interest in an 
interview, though one did not ultimately result. I did not receive a response 
from Senator Leahy’s office. 
 
